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ABSTRACT
This document reviews resource recovery as a way for
communities to process their municipal refuse, to produce
energy, and to serve as an economic development tool.
The report is a pre-feasibility analysis of building a
waste-to-energy plant for the cities of Somerville and
Cambridge, Massachusetts. In each of its six sections,
the paper presents both the generic elements of resource
recovery facilities as well as a specific analysis of
the information presented in the Cambridge/Somerville
context.
The first section provides the contextual information
about the two cities. The next section is a review of the
state of the art in resource recovery plant technologies.
Section III is a financial analysis comparing a variety
of supply/demand/technology hypothetical scenarios to
determine the appropriate financing and ownership options.
The best scenarios were then further examined by means
of a sensitivity analysis to determine the significance
of the uncertainties involved. Section IV describes the
environmental and economic impacts of the resource recovery
plant on Cambridge and S6merville. Section V presents
the important legal considerations as well as presenting
a step-by-step implementation process for the project.
Finally, Section VI synthesizes the findings of the
previous section into a set of recommendations for
Cambridge and Somerville.
Thesis Supervisor: Phil Herr
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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4SECTION I--INTRODUCTION
5INTRODUCTION
Resource recovery has been touted as the "ideal"
solution to two critical urban problems--the unavail-
ability of sanitary, environmentally sound methods for
disposing of municipal solid waste, and the high cost and
unreliability of energy. The answer is quite simple, say
the advocates. Waste can be burned and the heat so
generated captured in the form of steam. The steam can
be used subsequently to heat buildings, generate elec-
tricity or power industrial processes. Far from idle
theory, this solution is being practiced throughout
Europe, Japan and most recently in the United States.
Today, in the United States over 30 waste-to-energy plants
are in operation, with nearly 50 more scheduled to
. 1
come on line soon.
The densely populated cities of the Northeast seem
particularly in need of the creative problem solving
demonstrated by resource recovery. Land is at a premium,
and except for areas considerably removed from the cities,
developed. The prices for energy here are the highest
in the nation, and New England has been proven extremely
vulnerable to supply interruptions. In addition the
well documented process of corporate disinvestment from
6the Frost-Belt has resulted inindustrial abandonment and
its accompanying blue collar unemployment.
While resource recovery cannot pretend to be the magic
remedy for all of the above ills, it does offer some promise
in the solid waste disposal, enerqy production, andeconomic
development areas. Resource recovery technologies decrease
the volume of the municipal refuse stream by up to 95%, 2
prolonging the use of scarce landfill sites; the steam
generated is a locally produced, "renewable" energy source;
and the production of this less expensive and more reliable
energy source might aid cities in maintaining or attracting
industry.
The contextual factors that make resource recovery
appealing for the urban centers of the Northeast, however,
also work to make its adoption difficult. The conditions
described, plus some Massachusetts specific limitations,
make municipal budgets extremely constrained. Much of
local government management is defen'sive and the popula-
tion is concerned with losing as little as possible in
municipal services.
Furthermore, the national government has explicitly
abdicated responsibility for helping municipal governments
interested in resource recovery by eliminating the division
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency that
formerly dealt with waste-to-energy, and closing the.National
Center for Resource Recovery. This leaves the resource
recovery industry as the major repository for information,
7making non-industry sponsored feasibility analyses more
difficult and at the same time more important.
This report is such an analysis. It explores the possi-
bility of building a waste-to-energy plant to serve the
cities of Somerville and Cambridge to be located at either
city's present refuse transfer station. With their combined
75,000 tons of municipal solid waste a year, the cities could
save over 2,000,000 gallons of oil-equivalent each year,3
while potentially reducing the cost of municipal solid waste
disposal.
Nonetheless, the time and resource commitment needed to
build a waste-to-energy facility is high. Thus, a resource
recovery plant should be carefully scrutinized before Somer-
ville and Cambridge endorse it, yet it offers enough poten-
tial benefits to merit serious consideration.
This report is divided into six sections which explore
sequentially a variety of factors that would affect the
potential resource recovery facility. This first section
provides the beginning information about Cambridge and
Somerville that sets the context for this analysis. The
next section is a review of the state of the art of re-
source recovery plant technology. It narrows the range of
waste-to-energy plant technologies that are applicable in
this case. The third section is a financial analysis of
the technologies recommended in Section Two. A variety of
supply/demand/technology hypothetical scenarios are posed
8and analyzed to determine the best situation given the
financing and ownership combinations that are explored.
These scenarios are further analyzed to test the sensitivity
of the findings to changes in the values of plant variables,
as well as to better understand the significance of the
uncertainties involved. This information is used to advise
Cambridge and Somerville of the level of risk they want to
absorb in the development of the resource recovery project.
The result is a determination of the key financial issues
that help guide the project sponsors.
After examining the feasibility of building a waste-
to-energy plant, the report moves on in Section IV to
examine the environmental and economic impacts of the
resource recovery development on Somerville and Cambridge.
Once these impacts are underst od, Section V describes
the legal framework which surrounds the waste-to-enerqy
project by identifying the legal considerations that
are important in the project planning. A discussion of
the individuals and groups involved in developing the
rpsource recovery facility and a presentation of a step-
by-step implementation process follows in this section.
Finally, Section VI synthesizes the findings of the
previous sections into a set of recommendations for Somer-
ville and Cambridge.
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RESOURCE RECOVERY FOR CAMBRIDGE AND SOMERVILLE
Cambridge's and Somerville's interest in developing
a resource -recovery facility stems from their commitment
to local energy planning, their interest in economic
development, and the impacts of Prop 2 in each munici-
pality.
Both Cambridge and Somerville have taken leading
roles in promoting community energy planning in the
Boston area. Cambridge appointed an Energy Commission
which studied local energy consumption patterns and
devised a set of comprehensive strategies to reduce
that consumption. They have been running a low-cost
weatherization program for low-income homeowners as
well as a small business audit program. Recently, the
City received a grant from the United State Department
of Housing and Urban Development to analyze the viability
of district heating*in Cambridge.
Somerville has been equally involved in local energy
activity. The City, in conjunction with a community coali-
tion, analyzed Somerville's energy consumption and also de-
vised aset of comprehensive conservation strategies. The
result has been an intensive door-to-door conservation/
information campaign in one neighborhood in Somerville, which
the group hopes will serve as a model for other neighbor-
* District heating refers to a distribution mechanism whereby
steam is generated at a central source, and distributed
through underground pipes to meet heat and hot water needs.
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hoods. Like Cambridge, Somerville has been running a low-
cost weatherization program for nearly two years, and has
weatherized 1500 homes as a result. It has also conducted
audits on all its municipal buildings and is in the process
of some major retrofits.
Thus these two municipalities are ready to explore
their energy production potential, as they have already
launched their conservation efforts. In addition, last
year's natural gas crisis and the oil supply crises of
previous years has made energy reliability a major concern
in the two cities.
A reliable and price-stable energy producing facility
can be an attractive economic development tool for Cambridge
and Somerville, an issue of concern for both cities. In-
stead of tax breaks which neither city can afford to give,
the promise of reliable and lower-cost energy could prove
quite a drawing card, especially for industries with large
energy needs.
In fact, on the Somerville-Cambridge border and less
than one quarter mile from the Somerville municipal refuse
transfer station, the City of Somerville has slated an
area for economic development, called Boynton Yards. The
City hopes to attract job-intensive light manufacturing.
A study recently prepared for the City by an economic
development consultant indicated that bulk products and
food processing firms might be the appropriate targets,
since the rail line and highway provide needed access and
II1
there are few sites located in the Boston inner belt that
serve their market and other needs.4 Bulk packaging and
food processing requires steam, which is the energy pro-
duct that is made at a resource recovery facility. A waste-
to-energy facility producing reliable and relatively low-
cost steam might help attract these and other high steam
consuming industries.
On the Cambridge side, Commonwealth Electric's (COM/ELEC)
Cambridge Steam Loop, hereinafter referred to as the Cambridge
Steam Loop, is located beneath the East Cambridge Revitaliza-
tion District (ECRD), oneof Cambridge'smajor economicdevelop-
ment areas. This area borders East Somerville and is under-
going nearly $400 million of new development.5 The Cambridge
municipal refuse transfer station borders the ECRD. Cambridge
hopes to expand the customer list for the Cambridge Steam Loop
as a way to maintain COM/ELEC's operation of the Loop. To
this end, the City is analyzing ways they might encourage
developers to join the-Cambridge Steam Loop for their buildings'
heating and hot water needs.
Finally, both Cambridge and Somerville are facing
troubling financial management issues as they attempt to
cope with Proposition 2 . Prop 2 requires these cities
to cut back on total municipal expenditures by 15% a year
until they reach the Prop 2 maximum tax rate, unless
there is an annual local override (see Impact Analysis).
This requirement on top of drastic reductions in federal
support and the subsequent increased demands on local
government means that officials at both city- halls are
exploring ways to cut cDsts without sacrificing jobs and
needed services. And both are concerned about the effects
of all aspects of this situation on their ability to re-
tain and attract businesses. The fiscal realities they face
causes them to seek innovative solutions, such as resource
recovery which can address several problems at once.
In sum, Somerville and Cambridge approach the develop-
ment of a waste-to-energy plant as a way to continue to
pursue the production of reliable and affordable energy,
as a potential economic development tool, and as a means
to lower municipal expenses by gaining lower costs for
refuse disposal. Resource recovery provides a unique
opportunity to work towards solving several types of
community problems through the development of a single
project.
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PROJECT BACKGROUND
Somerville and Cambridge are adjoining primarily
residential cities with some commercial and industrial
activity. Somerville with a population of 70,000 located
6
on four square miles, and Cambridge with a population of
7
95,000 located on six square miles, are two of the most
densely populated cities in the country.
The quantity of solid waste generated in Cambridge
and Somerville is substantial: 35,000 tons annually in
8 9
Somerville and 40,000 tons annually in Cambridge, enough
to provide steady and adequate fuel supply to a resource
recovery facility. The refuse collected by these muni-
cipalities originates in households and commercial esta-
blishments. This averages around 150-170 tons per day,
five days a week, per city. In both cases, the waste is
municipally collected while disposal is contracted out.
Most -ommercial trash and all industrial wastes are picked
up by private companies.
In Somerville, the municipal waste is dropped at a
transfer station on the site of old Somerville municipal
incinerator located about one-eighth of a mile from the
Cambridge border in East Somerville. It sits at the inter-
section of Medford Street, Poplar Street, Somerville Avenue
and the McGrath and O'Brien Highway.
Boston Power Associates has a twenty year contract to
14
dispose of Somerville's trash. The City pays $15.70/ton for
this service.10 The contract terms include a $32,000 lease
payment for the rent of the transfer station and a $.50/ton
fee for non-municipally picked-up trash that is dropped there.
Price for trash disposal is adjusted according to the national
Consumer Price Index. Since 1976, Boston Power Associates
has in turn subcontracted out to RESCO in Saugus to operate
the refuse transfer facility. Boston Power Associates is now
in the process of turning over the operation of the transfer
site to Joseph Amara, Inc., a trucking firm in Hyde Park.1 1
It is unclear what chanqes, if any, Amara will make in the
refuse disposal services.
In Cambridge, the transfer station is located in East
Cambridge on East Street, less than one mile from the Somer-
ville transfer station off the McGrath and O'Brien Highway.
The site borders the East Cambridge Revitalization District
(ECRD). From there, the refuse is picked up by Browning
Ferris, Inc. (BFI), and is taken to-a landfill in Plainville,
Massachusetts. The City pays BFI $18.65/ton for this ser-
vice, and has a five year contract with BFI which is renego-
tiated annually.1 2
Since the collection is a municipal function, the two
cities, then, have some control over the disposal of their
solid waste. In order to consider resource recovery, how-
ever, Somerville's trash disposal contract would have to
be renegotiated or cancelled.
15
The saleability of the energy produced is the other
crucial factor in determining the waste-to-energy feasibility.
Careful estimates must be made of ,the quantity, quality,
timing and reliability requirements of the energy that will
be demanded. Resource recovery systems produce steam. The
steam then leaves the plant in the form of hot water, elec-
tricity or steam itself. The market for the steam product
is as important to system viability as is the quarantee of
the waste supply. As with the solid waste fuel supply, be-
fore any resource recovery plant is constructed, the plant
owner and operator seek to have lonq-term contracts for the
purchase of the energy produced. These contracts are dis-
cussed in greater detail later.
The Cambridge Steam Loop, Somerville's Boynton Yards
economic development area and Boston Edison have been
identified as potential customers.
The Cambridge Steam Loop has been delivering a high
quality steam, 200 pound per square inch guage (psig) at
13480*F for about 80 years. Because over the years some of
its baseload customers have closed or moved, high quality
steam is in lower demand in the Loop area, steam rates have
been higher than the oil and gas alternatives, and market-
ing has been weak, the Cambridge Steam Loop operates only
at 50% capacity in the winter and 10-20% in the summer.
This demand translates into about 70,000 lbs/hour at winter
peak and year round baseload of approximately 30,000 lbs/
14hour. Oil and gas fired boilers produce the steam.
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The result is that COM/ELEC has not been pleased with
its steam business and has hinted at withdrawing from this
market altogether. The City of Cambridge is very interested
in maintaining COM/ELEC's operation of the steam loop as part
of the City's enerqy policy, and is working with Cambridqe
Steam to increase the value of the steam loop to COM/ELEC.15
The opportunity to purchase lower cost, reliable steam might
be just the incentive needed to keep COM/ELEC operating the
Cambridge Steam Loop.
The amount of steam produced by a Somerville/Cambridge
waste-to-energy facility would be about 40,000 lbs/hour,1 6
enough to supply the Cambridge Steam Loop base load for 8 months
out of the year. If the steam from this facility can be pro-
duced more cheaply than with Cambridge Steam's current oil and gas
boilers, then it would make sense for Cambridge Steamto purchase
the resource recovery steam to serve its baseload needs. The
oil and gas boilers would only be used for the peak winter months.
The Somerville Boynton Yards economic development
area offers some existing and potential energy customers.
The area is bordered by some food processing plants which
have already indicated some interest in a steam hook-up. 17
And as the economic development consultant report indicated,
the industries most likely to movc into the area use steam
for their processing. If both existing and potential steam
users can be confirmed as customers, then a Somerville
Steam Loop served by the resource recovery plant looks
promising.
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Finally, the Public Utilities Regulatory Power Act
(PURPA) requires that the electric utilities purchase
power from alternative, small sources. 18Developers of the
resource recovery facility could negotiate a direct hook-up
to Boston Edison, and in this way guarantee a market for
its energy in the form of electricity.
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SITES
The old Somerville incinerator, which is the current
Somerville solid waste transfer station, and the refuse
transfer station in East Cambridge, are the two sites for
the resource recovery facility analyzed in this report.
Either site could house a plant to serve both Somerville's
and Cambridge's solid waste disposal needs.
These two sites are selected because of their current
usage as solid waste disposal places, the proximity of the
Somerville Boynton Yards economic development area and
the Cambridge Steam Loop, and the availability of enough
land at or around the site to develop and operate the
resource recovery plant.
Solid waste disposal facilities are a hard thing to
site because their potential neighbors are afraid of odor
and litter nuisances, and traffic impacts that have been
traditionally associated with refuse disposal. - However,
in today's modern facilities, these impacts are minimal
if any. To protect the interests of the community-at-
large, refuse disposal sites require public hearings and
permits from the local Board of Health and the Massachu-
setts Department of Environmental Engineering (see Imple-
mentation). They may also have to submit an Environmental
Impact Report.
Given the density of each community, few, if any,
alternative disposal sites existed when these were selected
19
that would have been acceptable. Today, this situation
is even more true with new development pressures in each
city.
Each of the current sites have excellent highway access,
thereby limiting traffic impacts. Furthermore, the sites
are located less than one mile from each other along the same
major highway, the McGrath and O'Brien, meaning that changes
in traffic patterns and increased fuel costs would be minimal.
Most importantly, however, solid waste disposal is the
expected usage at these sites, thus limiting surprises to
all involved. In addition, large vacant lots border each
site. This land can be used during construction and/or
for facility operations. And the vacant lots and buildings
scattered in the area can be marketed and developed with
the reliable and reasonably priced energy from the resource
recovery plant in mind.
The two key elements of a successful resource recovery
are fuel supply and energy customers. The municipal ~solid
waste streams from both Cities, and the proximity of these
sites to Somerville's Boynton Yards and the East Cambridge
Revitalization District served by the Somerville and Cam-
bridge Loops respectively, provide this match.
In sum, the preliminary conditions exist in Cambridge
and Somerville to merit the further investigation of develop-
ing a resource recovery plant. The site for the plant will
20
either be the current Somerville or Cambridge municipal
solid waste transfer station; Somerville's and Cambridge's
municipally collected refuse is to be the source of the
solid waste to fuel the facility, and the customers for
the energy generated are projected to be the Cambridge
Steam Loop, or the Somerville Steam Loop and/or Boston
Edison.
Given these specific project elements and the
considerations of Cambridge and Somerville mentioned
earlier, the following sections discuss the technical,
financial, environmental, economic, legal and imple-
mentation aspects of developing a resource recovery
plant for these municipalities.
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The following Somerville firms showed some interest
in a steam'hook-up when contacted during the energy demand
study.
American Electroplating Corporation
26 Chestnut
Contact: Gerry Levy, 776-1620
Marden Wild Corporation
P.O. Box 499
Contact: Jack Coppinger, 666-0400
White Rose Baking Company
230 Somerville Avenue
Contact: Tony, 776-4400
World Meat Exports
541 Windsor
Contact: Mr. Hark, 625-0314
24
CAMBRIDGE/SOMERVILLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT HEATING
AND COOLING STUDY
1. Name of business:
a. Type of business:
b. Uses for building:
c. Physidal Plant Manager:
d. Address:
e. Phone:
2. Type of Construction:
a. Date of construction:
b. Total square footage:
d. Thermal standards to which the building is built:
BTU/SF/DD heating:
Watts/SF lighting:
3. Energy Requirements: 5 day 7~day other
a. Heating BTU/HR: Hourly Peak Annual
b. Cooling BTU/HR: Hourly Peak Annual
c.' Lighting KW:~ Hourly Peak Annual
d. Process BTU/HR: Hourly Peak Annual
4. Type of Fuel Used: Stea.m GAs Coal Oil Electticity
a. List supplier of each type of fuel used, cost & amount
b. If known, What are the monthly fuel bills and amounts
for the last year? List on separate sheet
5. Mechanical System.
a. Heating System
1. Transfer medium: air Water 'temp'
steam electfic resistance
heat pump: water or air
2. Terminal Type: radiator fan doils
d ictwork and registers
b. Cooling System
1. System Type: Mechanical absorption
2. Terminal Type: ductwork and registers
fan coil units
c. Process Energy Needs
1. What type of energy do you use now and for what?
25
6. Cost Factors
a. Whb pays the utility bills: tenant blda owner
7. Are you doing or do you anticipate any major capital
improvements or expansion? If yes, what.
8. Have you initiated or are you planning any specific
energy efficiency actions? If yes, what.
26
High Steam-Consuming Industries
STANDARD
INDUSTRY INDUSTRIAL CODE #
Beverages 2984, 2085, 2086
Chemicals 2819, 2833, 2869
Food Processing 2033, 2034, 2035,
2024, 0174, 5142
---------------------------------------------
Glass Manufacturing 3221, 3231
Metals Manufacturing 3334, 3354, 3361,
3339
---------------------------------------------
Pulp & Paper 2611, 2621, 2631,
2649, 2435
Manufacturing 2645, 2651, 2652,
2661, 2499, 2541,
5113, 2492, 2426,
3275
--------------------------------------------
Rubber and Tires 3021, 3069, 2111
--------------------------------------------
Textiles 2211, 2221, 2231,
2251, 2253, 2254,
2249, 2271, 2281,
2282, 2284, 2399
--------------------------------------------
Heavy Manufacturing ----------------
--------------------------------------------
Pharmaceuticals ----------------
United Conference of Mayors, Resource Recovery Energy Markets,
page 5.
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NOTES
1. United States Conference of Mayors, "Resource Recovery
Activities," City Currents, Special Issue, United States
Conference of Mayors, Institute for the Development of
Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington, D.C., March 1982.
2. Conversation with John Culp, CSI, Solid Waste
Management Consulting Firm, February 17, 1-982.
3. Steam quality varies in BTU content, but averages one
million BTU/1000 lbs. The steam in the Cambridge Steam
Loop has an energy value of 1.2 million BTU/1000 lbs,
according to engineer Penti Aalto of Pequod Associates.
300,000 lbs steam (1,000,000 BTU) = 2,144,000 gallons
140,000 BTU @ gallon of oil oil equiv.
4. Conversation with Tenny Lantz, Harrington, Keefe &
Shork, February 22, 1982.
5. Luberoff, David, "Boomtown. Nearly $800 million in
New Development is Planned for Cambridge," Cambridge
Tab, Newton, MA, April 14, 1982.
6. Conversation with Rick Mitchell, Somerville Office
of Planning and Community Development, February 15,1982.
7. Conversation with Richard Fahlander, Cambridge
Community Development Department, February 16, 1982.
8. Conversation with Commissioner Dave Reilly, Somer-
ville Department of Public Works, February 23, 1982.
9. Conversation with Commissioner Everett Kennedy,
Cambridge Department of Public Works, February 23, 1982.
10. Conversation with Commissioner Dave Reilly, Somer-
ville Department of Public Works, February 23, 1982.
11. ibid.
12. Conversation with Commissioner Everett Kennedy,
Cambridge Department of Public Works, February 23, 1982.
13. Pierce, Robert, "A Brief Description of Kendall
Station," Cambridge Electric Company and COM/ENERGY
Steam Corporation, December 9, 1981, p.5 (printed text
of speech delivered to District Heating Working Group).
14. ibid. Appendix attichment, 1979 Steam Sales.
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15. Conversation with Richard Fahlander, Cambridge
Community Development Department, February 16, 1982.
16. See Base Case Assumptions, Section III.
17. An Energy Demand Survey of the area was performed
by the authors of this report. A copy of the survey is
included in the attachments.
18. Section 201 and 210 of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978.
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PLANT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
This section discusses the plant technology optionsavail-
able for a resource recovery facility to serve somerville and/
or Cambridge. This technology review evaluates the possible
plant technologies in terms of the capability of disposing
refuse from Somerville and Cambridge and the ability to serve
either the Somerville or Cambridge Steam Loop, and/or sell
electricity to Boston Edison.
The spectrum of possible resource recovery technologies
is discussed. The available technological processes fall into
three categories: mass burning to on-site steam recovery; refuse
derived fuels involving homogenization of the waste stream to
make it portable and flexible; and pyrolysis, a set of process-
es whereby a liquid fuel substitute is derived from the waste.
Within the categories each specific technology rTescription out-
lines the technology's operations, problems, capacity range,
energy production capability, system reliability, pollution,
and capital costs. In addition, the options for materials
recycling are presented.
32
Technology Description. Waterwall incinerators are mass
burning facilities. Refuse is fed exactly as received into
the combustion unit. Generally solid waste is dumped into a
storage pit, lifted by overhead crane, and dropped into the
furnace. The sides of the boiler furnace are made of closely
spaced steel tubes welded together to form a continuous wall.
The tubes are filled with circulating water, thus the name
"waterwall incinerator". The burning of the qarbaqe heats the
water, thereby producing steam. The steam is then fed directly
into the stribution system, or run through a turbine to pro-
duce elec .city, and steam or hot water.
Waterwall incinerators can be considered a "proven" tech-
nology. There are currently at least 19 municipal or commer-
cial operating waterwall plants in the United States, including
two in Massachusetts: a municipally operated facility in Brain-
tree and the RESCO plant in Saugus. At the same time that they
have been in operation disposing of solid waste and producing
energy, they have acted as laboratories for US engineers and
technicians. The problems encountered at these facilities have
been handled, and the solutions derived at these sites can be
incorporated into new designs today.
Technology Problems. There remain problems to be worked out
in the operation of waterwall systems. One major unresolved
difficulty stems from the hetergenous nature of the
33
waste fuel, in terms of size, density, and moisture content.
This results in uneven temperatures in the boiler and varying
quantities of steam produced. The rate of steam production can
oscillate as much as 30% of the average load. Stokers have been
employed to mitigate some of the fuel heterogeneity by exposing
more of the surface of the waste as it travels through the fur-
nace. There is, however, a fifteen minute time laq between the
stoker charge and a change in the steam rate.
The second major problem associated with waterwall techno-
logy is the corrosion of the superheater and boiler tubing.
It has been handled successfully in a variety of ways, and the
latest waterwall systems look even more promising.
Finally, grate wear and overheating have been experienced
at some waterwall facilities. Particularly troublesome has
been the lodging of glass, grit and slagged aluminum between
grate surfaces, accelerating the normal wearing process. Basic
pre-sorting of non-combustible materials may resolve this pro-
blem, as well as modifications in grate design which are being
explored.
Waste Capacity. The quantity of waste that can be handled
viably in the waterwall incinerator system ranges from 200 tons
per day (tpd) to 3,000 tpd. Most United States facilities have
a capacity of 1000 to 1500 tpd.
Energy Production. Current operating facilities vary in
the quality and quantity of steam produced. For example, the
34
Braintree plant produces 60,000 lbs/hourof alow quality-250 pres--
sure per square inch (psi)steam-half of which qoes to the Art
2
and Leather Co., employing over 100 people. The RESCO facility
in Saugus produces 320,000 lbs/hour of 890 psi, 874*F steam
serving most of General Electric's needs in Lynn.3 This General
Electric plant employs 13,000 people. In other communities, the
steam is used for district heating and cooling systems, in-
dustrial processes or converted into electricity and/or hot
water.
Generally, the plants have an overall thermal conversion
efficiency level of 65-70%, the same as good home oil furnaces.
Pollution/Landfill. Particulate emissions continue to be
a problem with this technology. Although all such facilities
are equipped with modern pollution devices, several of the oper-
ating plants have at times exceeded particulate emission standards.
On occasion plants have been closed due to their failure to
meet these performance criteria. The particulates, however,
seem to be the only problem with regard to air quality, in con-
trast to the air pollution problems of fossil fired plants.
Moreover, most of the time these plants operate within the EPA
standards. While the air quality issus needs further research,
the major air pollution problems initially associated with the
technology are considered solved.
After the waste is burned, 5% by volume or 20-30% by
weight still requires disposal. Usually this material is land-
filled. Some plants have been experimentingr-ith processing the
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residue to remove some remaining recoverarles, particularly
ferrous metals, or for use as road building materials.
Reliabirlity. Although some of the waterwall plants have
experienced occasional shutdowns due to technical difficulties,
for the most part these systems have proven reliable both as
waste disposal facilities and as energy producers. For
example, the Nashville, Tennessee plant, which consists of
two waterwall incinerators with one gas or oil fired back-up
burner, has provided reliable service to its heating and
cooling customers since 1974.4 In fact many of the steam and
chilled water users do not have any back-up capacity in their
buildings. They have not been disappointed, as the system
has been able to supply all their energy needs 24 hours a
day, 365 days a year. Similar testimony to this mass burning
technology's reliability is the Harrisburg plant, where two
waterwall incinerators use not only municipal solid waste but
also sewage sludge to produce energy for 670 customers.5 Also
after initial shakedown, the RESCO plant has been successfully
operating since 1975.6
Typical waste storage facilities hold two-to-three day's
waste delivery depending on the plant size and level of opera-
tions. Average yearly maintenance requires that the incinera-
tor be out of operation for 15% of the time--10% is regularly
scheduled and 5% is due to unexpected circumstances. Because
of the high capital costs and operating efficiences, waterwall
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plants operate continuously all year, 7 days a week, except for
maintenance downtime periods.
Capital Costs. Waterwall facilities require on-site
construction. This start-up and construction takes at least
2-3 years to complete. Current estimates are $50,000 per ton
design capacity (see Base Cass Assumptions).
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II. Modular Incinerators.
Modular incineration is a term applied to a variety of
prefabricated, or modular units used in the mass combustion of
waste in small scale applications. Similar to large mass
burning units, the smaller modular units produce steam and
hot water. Recent developments have included the possibility
of electrical generation.
The most common operating modular combustion unit is the
controlled air system. While there are other modular designs
wh- n are in-the experimental stages, for the Durposes of
this analysis when the term "modular unit" is used it means
the controlled-air, mass burninq technologies.
Modular systems open sizing options to cities. In the
1960s and early 1970s resource recovery technologies were
thought to have economies of scale that required 500-1000
minimum daily tonnage. In order to guarantee this amount
of waste, resource recovery facilities served regions or
large urbanized areas. However in the early 1970s several
manufacturers began to market shop constructed prefabricated
resource recovery units aimed at servicing smaller communi-
ties. With the advent of modular systems, resource recovery was
no longer limited to a regional project or a large industrial
user.
The first modular energy recovery system using municipal
solid waste began operation in Siloam, Arkansas in 1975, supply-
9
ing recovered steam to a nearby food processing company. In
the past few years many other modular facilities have begun
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operation. Of the 79 resource recovery projects in the US
identified by the National Center for Resource Recovery, about
one-third are modular units. Of the 31 operating plants as of
March 1982, nearly half are modular facilities.10
Today modular combustors are beginning to enter their
second generation of technology development. Many new systems
are being developed to resolve recurrinq problems Dow experi-
enced in operatinq systems.
Technology Description. Typical modular units have a two
combustion chamber design with a waste heat boiler for recovery
of steam. Oil or gas fired burners in the combustion chambers
help start-up and maintain proper burning temperatures.
At most modular resource recovery facilities, waste is
delivered and dumped on a receiving floor where front-end
loaders push the waste into a feeder that moves the waste into
the primary combustion chamber. Hot gases from the primary
chamber are vented into the secondary chamber or afterburner
which serves as a air pollution control mechanism. From here,
the gas is passed through the boiler when steam is demanded or
exhausted to the atmosphere through the exhaust stack on the
secondary chamber.
Unlike larger mass burning or refuse derived fuel facilities,
modular units do not have to run 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year, but can adjust their operation schedule to better accomo-
date the energy customer.
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Technological Problems. Boiler tube foulinq due to f lv ash
carryover from the secondary combustion chamber is a problem at
all facilities. In addition to the use of soot blowers, boiler
tubes must be cleaned at least every two weeks.
Another common problem is glass handling. Glass in the
primary chamber slags if the operating temperature is too
high. The molten glass hardens reducing capacity and causing
potential equipment damage. To minimize the problem a presorting
device can be installed to remove most of the glass and metal.
These recyclables can then be sold on the scrap markets.
Waste Capacity. Modular units range in size from as
little as 10 tpd to 120 tpd. Several units can be put in
one plant to handle up to several hundred tons per day.
Energy Production. Thermal energy conversion efficiencies
range from 55-65%. Most present systems produce steam only.
It can be used for district heating, industrial processes, and
in-plant steam-driven equipment. The first cogenerating modular
11
installation is under construction in Windham, Connecticut.
Modular systems could meet the steam needs of either the Cam-
bridge or Somerville loop.
Pollution/Landfill. Uncontrolled particulate emissions are
less than federal standards. Some of the new larger installa-
tions are using wet scrubbers, bag houses and electrostatic
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scrubbers to meet specific state and federal particilate emis-
sion requirements.
The ash to be landfilled is 4-5% by volume and 20-30% by
weight of the original trash load, as with waterwall plants.
Reliability. As with the other technologies, adequate
storage capacities and back-up fossil fuel fired boilers are
required. Modular resource recovery units are a newer techno-
logy than larger waterwall mass burning incinerators, so there
is a shorter, although positive, track record. The life span
of the modular units is approximately 15 years. Multi-module
facilities provide system redundancy and back-up capabilities
if one of the units is down for repairs. Plants must be down
at least once every two weeks to clean soot from boiler tubes.
Auxiliary fuel requirements vary from system to system from
12
$1 to $4 a ton.
Capital Costs. Modular units are shop-fabricated site
ready units which are placed on concrete foundations with
minimal field installation and erection requirements. Invest-
ment banking firms such as Paine Webber, Jackson and Curtis
recommend that these facilities be financed for 10 to 15 years.13
Modular plants can be on-line from the planning phase to opera-
tions in as little as one to two years.
Current estimates are approximately $30,000 per ton design
capacity. As with waterwall units, if cogeneration is added
the costs jump significantly (see Base Case Assumptions).
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REFUSE DERIVED FUEL TECHNOLOGIES
The technological processes that take waste and convert it
to a portable energy product after removing recoverable materials
are referred to as refuse derived fuel (RDF) processes. RDF
processes are newer than massburning systems, but in some cases
appear to be economically viable.
Refuse derived fuel technologies are in the "shakedown"
stage working out the bugs for later efforts. Manufacturers are
experimenting with several variations of the form of the RDF
product and the combustion process. Some plants, for example
the Bridgeport, CT facility have been economic and technological
14
disasters. However, some are beyond the speculation stage. The
Akron, Ohio RDF facility processes 1000 tons per day of municipal
15
solid waste and the Ames, Iowa plant has been handling 200 ton
16
per day (tpd) since 1975.
Technology Description. The key characteristics that dis-
tinguish refuse derived fuel from mass burning technologies are
the preprocessing recovery of reusable materials and the homo-
genizing of the diverse municipal waste stream. In preprocessinq,
mechanical or chemical processes have been developed to sort out
the trash's valuables. The ~homoqenizationqenerally is accom-
plished by shredding the combustible waste into equally sized pieces.
These particles are usually four to six inches in size, though
some facilities run them through a second shredder process to
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create particles as small as three-quarters to one inch in size.
These pieces can be then treated to produce a densified or pel-
litized refuse derived fuel, wetted down to produce a less vola-
tile product, or powdered. Untreated, shredded RDF tends to be
the most common.
The waste pieces so created, called RDF, can either be:
(1) substituted for coal in utility boilers, in which case the
RDF contribution only represents 10-12% of the heat reauirement;
or (2) burned in special "dedicated" boilers designed for RDF
only, a promising technology that is still in the early stages
of its development.
There are three principal advantages of the refuse derived
fuel systems over the mass burning ones: (1) the RDF need not
be consumed at the production site. Due to the significant
reduction in volume over the as-received waste stream, it can
be transnorted to another, or several other, sites where the
steam demand is greater and boiler equipment already exists;
(2) the ability to substitute RDF for or use RDF in combination
with coal provides a more flexible fuel source; and (3) the
homogenization of the waste as a fuel source increases the
energy value and the constancy of the BTU value derived from
each ton of waste burned.
Technological Problems. Refuse derived fuel technologies
are still at the stage in which they require continuous on-site
modifications. Technical difficulties have sprung up with reqard
to numerous aspects of plant operations. General problems with
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RDF production include difficulty with extensive wear on shredder
equipment, explosions durina the shredding process, contartination
of recovered materials, and storage of the refuse derived fuel.
Other problems occur in the combustion of RDF. When used in co-
firing coal systems, increased ash production and air pollution
plus the ability to accept only limited quantities of RDF can
present problems. It is too early to dentify the process pro-
blems that will occur with a full scale dedicated boiler opera-
tion.
Waste Capacity. In the United States, according to the
National Center for Resource Recovery, there are 14 existing and
17
planned RDF facilities as of March 1982. On the whole they tend
to be bigger than the mass burning ones. Existing and planned
facilities handle 4G0 tons per day to 2,OC tons per day (tpd) of
municipal solid waste, with most falli in the 1,000 to 2,000
tpd range. Economies of scale are necessary to make the re-
covery of recyclable materials worthwhile.
Energy Production. Unlike waterwall and modular systems,
steam is not the direct energy product, but a result of burning
the RDF. The steam produced is a function of the boiler the
RDF is used in. For example, in the case of utility plant co-
firing, the steam is of a high enough pressure and temperature
to be run through electricity-generdting turbines. In the case
of the dedicated boiler burning, the product is medium tempera-
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ture and pressure steam, suitable for industrial process and
space conditioning applications.
The energy content per pound of refuse derived fuel is
higher than that of raw municipal solid waste used in the mass
burning technologies. The removal of the unburnable recoverables
combined with the homogenization of the waste through shredding
means an increased thermal content for the RDF. The RDF contains
5,300 to 5,600 BTUs per pound of refuse, compared to about 4 ,700
BTUs/lb in the modular and 5,000 BTUs/lb in the waterwall
systems discussed.
The efficiency of energy production from refuse derived
fuel is affected by the combustion process utilized. If co-fired
in a coal utility boiler, the RDF will be converted at the same
conversion efficiency rate as the coal. If burned alone, in
a dedicated boiler, the conversion efficiency should be about
the same as a waterwall incineratcr.
Pollution. The air pollution a-ssociated with RDF burnig
technologies seems to be controllable. When used in co-firing
plants, much can be abated through the coal anti-pollution
devices, though further research in this area is necessary.
Reliability. It is too early to assess these systems'
reliability.
47
Capital Costs. Refuse derived fuel facilities, like
waterwall facilities, reqire on-site construction. Estimates
of the capital costs are expected to start at well-above the
cost per design ton of waterwall systems.
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PYROLYSIS
Pyrolysis is the most technically complex resource re-
covery technology. Pyrolysis is mentioned in brief because of
the national attention generated by the Baltimore pyrolysis
project. However, pyrolysis should not be a technology con-
sidered for the Somerville-Cambridge resource recovery
facility.
The pyrolysis process takes pre-sorted (as in RDF) wastes
and burns the combustible part in an oxygen-starved environ-
ment. The product is a medium-BTU gas and oil-like liquid
fuel. These products are highly valued as energy forms due to
their extreme flexibility.
While valued for the energy it produces and for its non-
polluting character, this technology must be considered
unproven at this point in time. Pyrolysis is in the testing
stages and does not appear viable in the foreseeable future.
The only municipally sized operating facility, in Baltimore,
has gone through a painful process of remodification after
remodification.18 Today it is closed due to the City's belief
that it cannot be made to work within the range of feasible
19
resources.
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RESOURCE RECOVERY PLANT TECHNOLOGIES
SUMMARY CHART
Waterwall Modular
Feature:
Capacity (tpd)
Range
Typical
#of Existing
Facilities
Operating
Problems
Thermal Conv.
Efficiencies
Direct Energy
Product
Air pollution
Lifespan
200-3000
1000-1500
19
Minimal
65-70%
All Steam
Pressures
Some
20+ years
100-400
200
29
Few
55-65%
Low Pressure
Steam
Almost None
15+ years
400-2000
1000-2000
22
Some
70%
RDF
20+ years
Reliability
Downtime
Capital Cost
@ Ton Oper. Cap.
Operating Level
Minimum
Construction Time
15% a year
$50,000
7 days/week
2-3 years
Once Every
Two Weeks
$30,000
Adjustable
1-2 years
More than
$50,000
7 days/week
RDF
Yes Yes
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RECOVERABLE MATERIALS
Because it reduces the waste stream that must be disposed
of, decreases glass slagging problems in the resource recovery
facilities, and provides additional income, advance recycling
of recoverable wastes is discussed here as a possible addition
to the waste-to-energy plant's operations. Amaterials recovery
program could be organized in one of three ways: (1) collection
of recycldble materials at their source; (2) source separation
and a voluntary drop-off center; and (3) removal of recylcable
materials at the resource recovery facility itself through
mechnical separation processes.
Source separation is a more effective way of recovering
recyclables than through post-collection mechanical processing.
Source separation is the method by which recylcable materials--
glass, paners, cans, etc.--are sorted out of the refuse stream
before they enter it, by the household or business that generates
the trash. The separation can be mandatory or voluntary, andthe
recyclables can be collected in conjuction with municipal trash
pick-ups or the generators can be asked to bring the materials
to a central location, drop-off center.
The drop-off center, where individuals are required to
deliver separated materials to a storage site is the most
commonly employed collection method for recycling prograns.
Presorting devices can be installed at the plant to remove
up to 80% of the glass and metal from the refuse stream before it
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is processed.20 As discussed in the RDF section, mechanical
separation requires economies of scale larger than the Somer-
ville-Cambridge palnt is designed to handle.
Three important facts set the context for Somerville and
Cambridge's decision about whether and which recycling program
to incorporate with the resource recovery plant development.
First, while several communities in the area have successful
source separation/collection operations, Somerville attempted
such a program in the mid-1970s and was unsuccessful. And
alhtough the reasons for this failure are known and could be
accounted for in redesigning another separation and/or collec-
tion program, the legacy of the negative experience is a huge
set of political and educational hurdles to overcome before
source separation/collection efforts could be viable in Somer-
ville.
Second, in the Spring of 1982, the Massachusetts State
Legislature passed the Bottle Bill. This piece of legislation
will be up for voter consideration in November through a repeal
referendum. If the referendum fails, the Bottle Bill mandates
dramatic reductions in the glass portion of the refuse stream.
If all the glass were removed, the municipal waste stream would
be reduced by approximately 10%.21 Thus the Bottle Bill would
decrease the amount of refuse that is to be disposed of and
largely would eliminate the glass slagging difficulties in
resource recovery plants. It would also decrease the value
of the recoverable materials that arrive at the plant if source
separation does not occur, making at-plant separation even
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less viable. In sum, the Bottle Bill reduces the incentives
for adding a recycling component to the resource recovery
effort.
Third, the salvage industry credo is "scrap is not sold,
it is bought." In other words, recycling is a demand-side
industry, where glass, papers, and used cans remain trash un-
less someone is willing to buy them. This presents two pro-
blems: market instability and material contamination. The
market for recyclables, particularly paper, is extremely
volatile with boom and bust cycles. However, contracts which
guarantee a minimum purchase price would help avoid this
problem.
Recycled glass and ferrous materials must meet quality
requirements. Glass manufacturers have established stringent
contamination specifications for waste glass. It is not ,
unusual for glass recyclers to reject entire loads because of
contamination.
Municipal scrap is siqnificantly different than other
sources of ferrous scrap. The lead and tin in the municipally
generated ferous scrap are contaminants. The scrap may also
contain organics or other materials that make the scrap unde-
sirable for certain uses.22 Thus, income from recovering
materials is likely to be insecure and insignificant.
Therefore, while recycling offers many benefits to the
society as a whole, it would probably not be a good use of
municipal time and effort at the point of the resource recovery
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facility's initiation. It would represent a political
liability at a time when the Cities need to generate support
for the project. In addition, the economics are marginal and
incentives small, especially if the Bottle Bill is not over-
ridden. However, a possible way to have a recycling program
would be for the Cities to cooperate with community groups and
non-profit organizations that might want to sponsor such acti-
vities. This would be an ideal solution, as the resource
recovery facility would benefit at little expense to Somerville
and Cambridge, while the groups involved generate much needed
income.
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TECHNOLOGY SELEC ION/RECOMMENDATION
It is clear from the above technology descriptions that
there are many technological options available to the cities of
Cambridge and Somerville in their evaluation of a resource
recovery facility. The pyrolysis technology has already been
eliminated as serious consideration, as it is in an experimental
phase of development. Among the remaining technologies Somer-
ville and Cambridge can choose how to process their waste, and in
what form to combust it. Much of the information collected about
the two cities can aid in the selection of technologies, by
estimating the contraints under which the system will operate.
Choice #1: Processing Waste.
The first issue is whether to pre-sort the waste or burn
it as-received. Although the usefulness of sorting will be
affected by many of the other issues, such as how much unifor-
mity is required in steam production, the key factors that
determine the advisability of pre-sorting are the size of the
waste stream and the local markets for recoverables. The size
of the combined Cambridge and Somerville waste stream is
approximately 300 to 400 tpd collected five days a week, or
about 215 tons to be processed over a seven day week period.
This is on the margin in terms of the economics of scale that
have been necessary to make onsite materials sorting worthwhile.
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Choice #2: Combustion Process.
Next, the process by which the waste is combusted must be
analyzed. There are several parameters which constrain this
choice. The first is the waste capacity that the plant will be
required to handle. As mentioned, Somerville and Cambridge pro-
duce about 215 tpd on a seven day/week basis. Although they
might be able to draw waste from other nearby communities, if it
is not necessary in order to make the plant viable, it would be
sensible not to complicate the plant's political implementation
and operations by drawing more institutional actors. As the
record of the regional resource recovery projects in North
Andover and along Route 128 demonstrate, it is difficult at
best to mesh the needs, interests and politics of many communi-
ties. Now only after years of negotiations is the North Ando-
ver project beginning to emerge from the talking stages, while
support for the 128 facility still vacilitates.23 These
factors move us even farther away from the RDF concept, since
mass burning technologies are better suited to match the small
and medium trash loads of Cambridge and Somerville.
The second issue affecting the technology selections is
the strained condition of the municipal budgets involved. The
situation created by Proposition 2 1/2 and the severe federal
cutbacks preclude consideration of municipal decisions that
are unnecessarily risky, where the unanticipated outcome would
strain an already tight municipal budget.
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Thus, thte only real choice for Cambridge and Somerville
in terms of the waste combustion process is between the two
mass burning technologies: waterwall incineration or modular
combustion units.
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CHAPTER APPENDIX
TECHNOLOGY
Representative Mass-Burning System Vendors in the U.S.
NAME
Browning-Ferris Inc.
Houston, TX
Waste Management Inc.
Oak Brook, IL
Widmer & Ernst
New York, NY
UOP
Des Plains, IL
Katy-Seghers Div.
Fulton Iron Works
St. Louis, MO
TECHNOLOGY
VKW (Germany)
Volund (Denmark)
Widmer & Ernst (Switzerland)
Martin (Germany)
Seghers (Belgium)
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Windsor, CT
Combustion Engineering
Northern Energy Corporation, Energy From Solid Waste,
A Primer for Local Industry and Government, Chapter 2, p. 1 4 .
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CHAPTER APPENDIX
TECHNOLOGY
Representative Vendors of Modular Waste-to-Energy Units
Basic Environmental Engineering, Inc.
21W161 Hill Street
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Burn-Zol
P.O. Box 109
Dover, NJ 07801
C.E. Bartlett-Snow
200 West Monroe
Chicago, IL 60606
Comtro Division
Sunbeam Equipment Corp.
180 Mercer Street
Meadville, PA 16335
Consumat Systems, Inc.
P.O. Box 9379
Richmond, VA 23227'
Environmental Control
Products, Inc.
P.O. Box 15753
Charlotte, NC 28210
Environmental Services
P.O. Box 765
Crossville, TN 38555
Corp.
Vicon Construction Co.
P.O. Box 100
Butler, NJ 07405
Giery Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 17335
Milwaukee, WI 53217
Kelley Company, Inc.
6720 N. Teutonia Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53209
Scientific Energy Engineering, Inc.
1103 Blackstone Building
Jacksonville, FL 32202
U.S. Smelting Furnace Company
(Smokatrol)
P.O. Box 446
Belleville, IL 62222
Washburn and Granger
85 5th Avenue
Patterson, NJ
O'Connor Environtech Corp.
Irvine Industrial Complex
100 Kalmus Drive
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Northern Energy Corporation, Energy From Solid Waste,
A Primer for Local Industry and Government, Chapter 2, p. 2 1 .
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1. United States Conference of Mayors, "Resource Recovery
Activities," City Currents, Special Issue, United States
Conference of Mayors, Institute for the Development of
Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington, D.C., March 1982.
2. Conversation with Ed Courchene, Plant Manager,
Braintree, MA Resource Recovery Plant, March 8, 1982.
3. United States Conference of Mayors, Saugus, A Case
Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
United States Conference of Mayors, Institute for the
Development of the Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington,
D.C., March 1980.
4. United States Conference of Mayors, Nashville, A
Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
United States Conference of Mayors, Institute for -the
Development of the Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington,
D.C., March 1980.
5. United States Conference of Mayors, Harrisburg, A
Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
United States Conference of Mayors, Institute for the
Development of the Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington,
D.C., March 1980.
6. United States Conference of Mayors, Saugus, A Case
Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
oi. cit., p.11.
7. United States Conference of Mayors, Nashville, A
Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
op. cit., p.10.
8. United States Conference of Mayors, Saugus, A Case
Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
op. cit., p.ll.
9. Northern Energy Corporation, Energy from Solid
Waste, A Primer for Industry and Local Government,
Northern Energy Corporation, Boston, MA, 1981, Chapter
2, p. 19.
10. United States Conference of Mayors, "Resource
Recovery Activities," p. cit.
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11. Northern Energy Corporation, op. cit., Chapter 8,
p.11.
12. Scaramelli, Alfred, et al. Resource Recovery Research
Development and Demonstration Plan, The Mitre Corporation,
Bedford, MA, United States Department of Energy, Washing-
ton, D.C., October 1979, p. 139.
13. ibid., p. 140.
14. United States Conference of Mayors, Bridgeport, A
Case Study of Economic Development-and Resource Recovery,
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15. United States Conference of Mayors, Akron, A Case
Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
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D.C., October 1980.
16. United States Conference of Mayors, "Resource
Recovery Activities," op. cit., p. 5.
17. ibid., p. 3-13.
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Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
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19. Conversation with Richard Mounts, Energy Analyst,
United States Conference of Mayors, March 24, 1982.
20. United States Conference of Mayors, N. Little Rock,
A Case Study of Economic Development and Resource Recovery,
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Development of the Urban Arts and Sciences, Washington,
D.C., November 1980.
21. Northern Energy Corporation, o2. cit., Chapter 3,
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22. ibid., Chapter 3, p. 11.
23. Conversation with Mary Mylie, Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Environmental Management, Solid Waste Section,
March 10, 1982.
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SECTION III--ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Part II--Financial Analysis
This chapter analyzes the financial feasibility of the
technical optic-s determined viable in the technology review
section. By examining the expenses and revenues of the two
selected resource recovery plant technologies, this chapter
will narrow the range of possible arrangements to a few
promising ones.
The analysis in the previous section concluded that two
plant technologies would be technically feasible for this
site--a waterwall or an air-combustion modular incinerator.
Both of these plant types are steam-producing, so could be
either linked to the Cambridge or Somerville Steam Loops and
used to generate electricity. Both production technologies
are mass burning processes, so do not involve any waste
pre-processing expenses. In addition, both options represent
"proven" technologies, though the waterwall has a longer
history and thus more of a track record. Aside from these
similarities,the technologies have different characteristics,
some favorina the waterwall, some the modular.
In order to illustrate concretely the economic tradeoffs
involved in the technology choice, this chapter examines the
financial feasibility of building a waterwall unit or a
modular facility to serve Cambridge and Somerville. The
issues are explored through the use of fourteen scenarios
covering the range of possible combinations of the three
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critical parameters--technology, fuel supply, and
energy production--that bound the facilities' operation.
Technology. The scenarios were designed to test the
practicability of the two plant technologies under dif-
ferent supply and demand conditions. In examining the
financial feasibility of the plant technologies, the
key tradeoff is between the greater efficiency of the
waterwall plants versus the lower capital costs associated
with the modular facilities. The differences are sig-
nificant with respect to both issues. In terms of effic-
iency, the waterwall units are able to extract approxi-
mately 5000 British Thermal Units (BTUs) per pound of
municipal solid waste processed, while the modulars
can recover only 4700 BTUs per pound of refuse.1
Meanwhile, the capital costs of building a waterwall
facility are approximately $50,000 per ton of installed
capacity, while the modulars cost only about $30,000/ton
installed capacity (see Base Case Assumptions).
The higher capital costs of a waterwall unit are
partially compensated by lower operating and maintenance
expenses, though the waterwall facilities' high capital
investment mandates their continuous operation and thus
staffing--seven days per week, twenty-four hours per day.
In contrast, modulars can be turned off over the weekend
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if energy demand is concentrated in the work week.
This non-continuous operation (five days per week)
facilitates off-hour maintenance, and so minimizes
down time that must be scheduled during hours of
energy demand. This can be significant--the continu-
ously operating facilities must plan on shutting down
for at least two weeks each year, requiring alternative
waste disposal and energy production arrangements be
made for that period. The five-day/week operations
should be able to avoid this costly off period.
The waterwalls also take longer than the modulars
to build and bring into operation--at least one addi-
tional year. Their greater track record, however,
enables the project sponsor to borrow funds for 23
years--three years for the construction and start-up
period, and twenty years expected plant life. Modular
facilities, on the other hand, have received less sup-
port from the financial community due to less familiarity.
Often they have been able to sell bonds for only a 17-
year term--two years for construction and start-up
plus fifteen years expected life. 2
Fuel Supply. In the case of resource recovery facilities,
the fuel used to produce steam and/or electricity is
municipal solid waste. Both cities' refuse could be
used to fuel either the Somerville or the Cambridge Steam
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Loop. If either city chose to build the plant to process
its waste only, the energy customer would be located in
that city. Cambridge's waste is not enough to meet the
Cambridge Steam Loop's baseload demand, and therefore less
appealing to Cambridge Steam Company though still pos-
sible. In Somerville, because the Somerville Steam Loop
customers are yet undetermined, it may be possible to
match their energy needs with a Somerville-only plant.
Therefore, the Somerville-only plant is used as the
model for a single-city plant, though a Cambridge-only
facility would exhibit similar characteristics. Two
supply situations are considered: (1) Somerville and
Cambridge processing their waste at this facility; or
(2) Somerville alone sending its waste here.
The fuel supply situation is a critical factor in
determining plant design. Either modular or waterwall
systems could accomodate trash from both cities. A
Somerville-only trash-processing facility, however,
would be too small to make the waterwall technology
practical. The capital costs of a Somerville-only
waterwall would in all likelihood never be recovered
over the plant's revenue stream.
Energy Production. There are two pieces of the energy
production situation that shape the scenarios--the
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energy customer and the energy product. The first issue
is whether the plant will be selling to the Cambridge
Steam Loop or to the Somerville Loop serving a combination
of some existing industries and ones proposed for location
in the economic development area. In the case of the
Somerville-trash-only plant, the choice is circumscribed
by plant capacity limitations. The smaller trash load
means less steam production. The quantity of steam
that could be produced from a Somerville-only plant may
be considered too small to be worthwhile for purchase
by the Cambridge Steam Loop. The Cambridge Steam Company
would still have to operate its boilers almost all of the
time and therefore might find it less worthwhile to
purchase additional steam. Thus, scenarios handling
Somerville trash only assumed the steam customer to be
the Somerville Loop.
A joint Cambridge-Somerville resource recovery plant
could produce enough steam to serve as the Cambridge Steam
Loop's baseload for about eight months of the year.
Cambridge Steam Company would purchase steam from the
waste-to-energy facility and only have to use its boilers
for peak user needs, providing considerable overall cost
savings. Alternatively, a dual-city facility could serve
the proposed Somerville Steam Loop. Scenarios were
developed to include each of these energy customers.
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The second a.spect of the energy production parameter
is the form of the energy product--steam and/or electricity.
Although most U.S. resource recovery facilities to date
have produced and sold steam directly, it is possible to
cogenerate (producing steam and electricity concurrently)
or use the steam to produce electricity only. Because of
federal law, the utility in the area must buy all elec-
tric power produced at the rate of the utility's
"avoided cost". 3
To equip a resource recovery plant to produce
electricity, the addition of a turbine an an upgrading
of the plant's boiler is required. This a dditional
equipment increases the capital cost of the facility by
about 20-30%, but allows the plant to continue to sell
the same quantity and quality of steam as before the
turbine addition, as well as some electricity.
In sum, while many combinations of the three criti-
cal parameters are theoretically possible in one plant,
practical engineering and design requirements necessi-
tate the best and most consistent fit between all these
parameters. In other words, while generators, turbines,
and boilers can be designed to handle a range of demands,
they work most efficiently if designed to perform under
one basic set of conditions. The scenarios were developed
to accomodate this situation.
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Scenario Development
All of the reasonable combinations of technology,
fuel suoly, and energy demand variables were laid out
and developed into fourteen "scenarios". In each scen-
ario, estimates were made of the value of the variable
components (such as steam quantity, capital costs, etc.)
based on the experience of similar resource recovery
facilities and data about the Somerville/Cambridge situ-
ation. Thus, base case values were computed. Each scen-
ario was analyzed under both public and private owner-
ship conditions, with the "A" case representing the
public ownership option and the "B" the private one.
(A detailed description of the development of the
Base Case is provided in a separate section which follows.
The private ownership calculations are based on current
tax laws.) Each scenario's cash flow situation was then
projected out over twenty years to illustrate the
economics of resource recovery over time.
In all of the scenarios, Cambridge and Somerville
need some basis for interpreting the final cash flows
in judging whether or not to build this resource recovery
facility. Although resource recovery can fulfill many
different objectives, its efficacy for Cambridge and
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Somerville will be measured here by determining the impact
on the community's tipping fees. This measure is used
because it most directly affects the Cities' municipal
budgets and their ability to deliver city services.
With or without the resource recovery plant, both cities
will have to absorb the cost of waste disposal, whereas
their energy production and economic development goals
represent, in a sense, optional activities. Those costs
of building and operation the resource recovery facility,
then, which are not covered by revenues from energy sales
are thought of here as waste disposal costs without a
waste-to-energy facility.
Therefore, in interpreting the cash flows for the
various scenarios, this next section presents the impacts
of the plant's financial operations on the tipping fees
by showing the scenario's "net tip fee". This quantity
is the expected total waste disposal costs divided by
the number of tons dumped, under base case conditions.
This net tip fee is then compared to the base case tip
fee of $16, which is roughly equal to the current cost
of solid waste disposal in the Boston area.
For the public ownership cases, the net tip fee was cal-
culated every year. This method was chosen because if Somer-
ville and Cambridge choose to own the facility they will be
required to pay for all operating expenses in the year they
74
occur, as well as absorb the excess revenue that same year.
Since private sector budgeting is often done differently,
however, the firms that might own the plant can look at the
life-cycle costs of operating the - cility, calculate their
expected return, and negotiate with Cambridge and Somerville
for a fixed tip fee. Thus, in the private sector half of the
scenarios, one net tip fee was calculated based on the
firm reducing tip fees by the amount exceeding their receipt
of a 30% Return on Equity.
The Scenario Groupings
The scenarios are grouped according to the energy
customer and waste supplier they will serve. In each case,
the scenarios are analyzed under conditions of public and
private ownership, the latter accounting for the tax
benefits available. This method of presentation was
selected because it offers the greatest clarity for
Somerville and Cambridge as the decision makers: the
community will first select the energy customer and
waste supplier, since these are the constraining para-
meters. To aid in this decision, this chapter presents
the range of reasonable groupings to clarify the choice
here.
The next decision for the two cities is the tech-
nology. The financial tradeoffs are illustrated within
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the scenario groups, since the technology choice will
be made within a scenario group. Thus, the comparison
of modular versus waterwall takes place here between
scenarios within a group rather than across groups.
Finally, the community must decide whether to build
the facility itself or to allow a private corporation
to own and operate the plant. This choice will also
be made within a given supply/demand situation, as the
community can better negotiate if it is clear about its
objectives with regard to the plant. This decision will
have to be made in conjunction with the technology selec-
tion, as the profitability and accompanying cost reduc-
tions will be a function of the technology choice.
The presentation here will focus on the level of tax
benefits anticipated, so that Cambridge and Somerville
can be knowledgable in negotiating for its share of
these subsidies.
However, none of these decisions should be made on
financial considerations alone. Other community objec-
tives play an important role in the relative attractive-
.ess of the different options, and these are described
in the sections that follow. The financial analysis
will eliminate some of the options as out of the realm
of feasibility, making the other factors easier to
weigh. And, as the cash flow charts and descriptions
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illustrate, beyond this narrowing the differences in
the financial advisability of the various options are
inconclusive independent of other considerations.
The Groups
The following summary chart illuminates the key
identifying factors among and between the scenario
groups, followed by an overview explanation of these
groups.
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Scenario Groups: Key Identifying Factors
Scenario Group 1-4: Refuse from Camb. & SOm., Energy to Camb. Loop
Technology
modular
waterwall
modular
waterwall
Energy Prod.
steam
steam
steam/elec.
steam/elec.
Size (tpd) 5 or 7 day
250
250
250
250
7
7
7
7
Capital $mm
9.8
14.8
12.4
17.5
Scenario Groun 5-9: Refuse from Camb. & Som., Energy to Som. Loop
modular
modular
waterwall
modular
9 waterwall
steam
steam
steam
steam/elec.
steam/elec.
300
250
250
250
250
10.55
7
7
7
9.0
14.0
11.6
7 16.7
Scen#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Scenario Group 10-11: Refuse from Som. only, Energy to Som. Loop
10
11
modular
modular
steam
steam
150
125
5
7
Scenario Group 12-14: Refuse from Camb &/or Som., Energy to Boston Edison
waterwall
modular
modular
electricity
electricity
electricity
--j
Cx,
* Somerville's refuse only
12
13
14
6.0
5.3
250
250
125
7
7
7
18.2
12.0
6.3
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The first group, comprised of Scenarios 1-4, is
based on the sale of steam to the Cambridge Steam Loop,
with any electricity going to Boston Edison. They
process the municipal solid waste from both Cambridge
and Somerville. Scenarios 5-9 also involve waste from
both cities, but would sell steam to industries existing
and expected to locate in the Somerville economic
development area, while any electricity generated would
be sold to Boston Edison. Scenarios 10-11 are Somer-
ville-only ones--they burn only Somerville's wastes
and serve the Somerville Steam Loop. These plants are
too small to make cogeneration a worthwhile option.
And the final scenario group, Scenarios 12-14, are
electricity-only generating facilities, with any re-
maining steam vented rather than distributed. A more
detailed analysis of the groups and the scenarios
within the groups follows here, and an explanation of
the development of the scenarios is presented in the
next chapter.
Results
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the
financial analysis that cut across scenario groups.
Stating these observations here fac1 Ltates elimina-
tion of some of the less plausible scenarios from
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further consideration, thus clarifying the analysis that
follows. First, building a resource recovery plant to
serve Somerville and/or Cambridge is viable from a finan-
cial standpoint. The two cities have several alternative
scenarios from which to choose which will lower the com-
munities' cost of waste disposal at the same time it
meets many of the other objectives noted in the first
section of this report. While the scenarios positing
the combined Cambridge and Somerville trash load as the
fuel supply and the Somerville Loop as the energy cus-
tomer look best due to the efficiencies of scale asso-
ciated with a larger facility and the anticipated steady
demand of the industrial users, the two cities could
find a promising scenario under any of the supplier/
customer situations analyzed with the exception of
electric-only plants. Thus, resource recovery offers
many benefits to the two communities, including savings
on waste disposal expenses, and is viable under several
alternative conditions.
The second general conclusion resulting from the
financial analysis is the significance of the role of
capital costs. Resource recovery technologies are highly
capital intensive--once built, the expenses involved in
operating the facilities pale in comparison to the costs
of building them. In every case analyzed here, the annual
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payment on capital was far greater than the total of all
other expenses--often twice as large. Consequently,
plant economics are very sensitive to the technology's
capital requirements.
Waterwall plants are quite capital intensive,
costing about one and two-thirds as much to construct
as a modular facility of the same daily tonnage capa-
city. Nonetheless, several factors mitigate the impact
of this difference, so that even in these high interest
rate times, waterwalls can be no more expensive than
the modular units on a life-cycle basis.
First, since waterwalls have more of an operating
history, they have been received better in financial
circles. Whereas modular unit builders have been able
to bond for a 17-year term only, the waterwall builders
have been able to repay the debt over 23 years. And
while the longer term increases the overall cost of
funds, it reduces the relative level of the annual
debt service payment, making money comparatively
less expensive in term ' of the annual cash flow.
The second mitigating factor is that the waterwall does
have an expected useful life exceeding that of an equivalent
modular unit. While the bond life may be shorter than the
true useful life of facilities for both plant technologies,
the waterwalls will be operational for a significantly
longer period. Thus, in addition to the longer debt repay-
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ment period of the waterwalls, the effective cost of capital
can be spread over a longer revenue stream. The issue of
plant replacement or alternative disposal, and the
accompanying additional investment is forestalled for a
greater number of years.
Finally, the cost of capital is determined at the begin-
ning of the project in dollars of that year's value. As the
plant operates over the years, the costs of its operations
are likely to rise with the general inflation rate of the
economy, while the cost of debt is fixed at its initial level.
In effect, then, as the costs of plant operation remain
steady in constant dollar terms, the cost of capital falls
at the rate of inflation. Since a key cost tradeoff involved
in modular versus waterwall technologies is the inverse
relationship between capital and operating costs, this fact
of deflating capital costs is significant.
The combination of these factors operating on the cash
flow stream is such that they effectively cancel out the dif-
ferences in capital investment required as the criteria for
selecting one or the other of the two technologies. Under
a given supply/demand situation, the waterwall unit shows
better returns if the community chooses to have the
facility owned by the private sector, since the value
of federal tax subsidies is a function of capital costs
(see last conclusion of this part). On the other hand,
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if Somerville and Cambridge prefer to own the plant,
a modular facility will exhibit better economics.
Thus, the technology choice is dependent on the
ownership structure selected.
The third general observation also relates to
this capital costs issue. One of the advantages
associated with the lower capital costs of the modu-
lar units is in their operational flexibility--namely,
that they can be turned off at points of low energy
demand such as over the weekend, while waterwall
technology mandates continuous operation. However, the
financial projections demonstrated that continuous
operation (7 days/week) is more practical in the Somer-
ville/Cambridge cases, regardless of the technology
choice. The fewer operating hours associated with
the 5-day operations demands a larger plant size than
the -day operations to accomodate the same annual
waste stream. In addition to the higher capital
costs of the larger plant, a non-continuous operation
requires more start up or auxilliary fuel. These
higher costs are partially offset by lower operating
and maintenance expenses resulting from the smaller
work force needed to run a 5-day plant plus the fact
that maintenance can be done on the weekends, whereas
the continuous operations require at least 2 weeks/year
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of downtime for regular maintenance. Nonetheless,
the continuous operation of the units under either
proposed scenario group situation results in a larger
positive cash flow than the equivalend 5-day plant.
Since neither Cambridge nor Somerville have any reason
at this point to prefer a 5-day operation, Scenarios
5 and 10 have been eliminated due to the better econo-
mics of their 7-day counterparts. Should the cities
find that a 5-day operation is more suited to their
needs, these Scenarios would merit further analysis.
The fourth general conclusion is to rule out the
possibility of cogeneration .f the intended steam
customer is the Cambridge Steam Loop. The high quality
steam demanded by the Cambridge Loop makes electric
production in addition to steam unviable prima facie:
Given the quality of steam demanded, little energy can
be extracted to produce electricity, without the addi-
tion of at least an equivalent amount of energy to
bring the steam back up to level. Thus, a cogenerating
resource recovery facility was judged infeasible if
the Cambridge Steam Loop is the desired steam buyer,
ruling out Scenarios 3 and 4 (also, see Base Case
Assumptions).
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when Cambridge and Somerville have other options that
offer the tax benefits in a more sensible way. Thus,
the final Scenario Group was eliminated wholesale.
The possible ways to better use tax benefits re-
lates to the last major conclusion of this part of the
report. While many combinations and permutations are
possible, the essential choice of ownership is between
the private and public sectors. The key financial
difference between private and public operations is
the impact of taxes, which in the case of resource
recovery turns out to have a positive impact on the
plant's cash flow. The magnitude of this impact
determines, or is determined by, the technology
choice discussed above.
In every case, public sector ownership and
operation of the plant is less expensive than the
pre-federal tax position of a private firm due to the
public sector savings on profit and property taxes.
Although a private firm could operate some of these
plants profitably independent of tax benefits, with-
out raising the fees judged in the Base Case Assump-
tions to be reasonable, the real profitability of
resource recovery development comes if the private
firm has other income which it desires to shelter
from federal corporate income taxes. If this is the
case, the firm can make a tremendous profit on the
tax benefits from the Somerville/Cambridge facility.
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The federal tax "incentives" that make this possible are
substantial. For example,in year one of operation the private
owner can take an investment tax credit equivalent to 10% of
the plant's cost plus a business energy tax credit equal to
5% of that cost. Then, the firm can deduct from its taxable
income (for both federal and state purposes) the portion of
the annual debt service that goes into interest payments as
well as an extremely liberal depreciation allowance. The
owner can deduct depreciation expenses at an accelerated rate
for the plant on an eight-year life, although the expected
useful life of the plant is 15-20 years.5 The value of these
federal/state tax subsidies is so high that tax specialists
and investment bankers urge corporations to get involved in
resource recovery only if they are certain of generating
enough income from other lines of business to more than use
these shelters, as they cannot be carried forward. The
subsidies are a function of the amount of capital invested,
so are greater if a waterwall facility is juilt than
if a modular unit is put in. The degree of cost savings
that the community can hope to secure through a public/
private "partnership" will thus be greater if the
technology selected is waterwall.
These tax supports to a private corporation appear
to be the only way to draw federal or state subsidies
into the project. Neigher the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts nor the Federal government has indicated any
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immediate willingness to provide direct assistance to
local governments for resource recovery facilities.
Thus, state and federal dollars will defer some of the
project costs only if the projects are owned by a
private firm. If the community wishes to benefit from
these subsidies, it must negotiate with the firm
about the amount of these subsidies that will be
used to defray project costs. :This analysis illustrates
the magnitude of the tax subsidies available to the
corporate sector in each scenario, so that the public
sector can be an informed bargaining agent should a
private ownership approach be pursued.
Other factors besides the final cash flow figures
enter into the decision about the appropriate ownership
structure for a Cambridge/Somerville facility. These issues
are elaborated in the sections following this one. In par-
ticular, the willingness of the Cities to assume project
risks will determine the strength of their bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the private firm. If Somerville and Cambridge
want the firm to absorb a substantial portion of the risks,
they will have to pay a premium for this in the form of
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higher tip fees. The value. of the firm's absorption of key
risks is assessed in the next section. For the financial
analysis done in this chapter, the important point to remem-
ber is that the net tip fees calculated here represent fees
under base case expectations, before assignment of risk.
They will be higher if the Cities choose to pay a risk
premium.
The analysis that follows is meant to present the
financial aspects of private and public ownership only.
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Scenarios 1-4
These scenarios would serve the Cambridge Steam
Loop, while processing the municipal solid waste of
both Cambridge and Somerville. Scenarios 1 and 3 are
modular units, with #1 producing steam and #3 steam
and electricity. Scenarios 2 and 4 are waterwall facil-
ities with #2 producing steam and #4 both steam and
electricity. As mentioned, the two cogenerating plants
were eliminated quickly, leaving Scenarios 1 and 2 for
serious consideration.
Scenario 1 and 2 plants would produce approximately
40,000 thousand pounds per hour high quality steam to
match the quality currently supplied by the Cambridge
Steam Company. Since Cambrdige Steam Company customers
demand steam on a continuous basis, both Scenarios 1
and 2 will be able to sell steam during all of the plant's
operating hours. These plants could fully meet the
base load demand of the Cambridge Steam Loop for 6 months
out of the year, nearly meet it for 2-3 others, and fall
short for the 3-4 peak months. This would enable
Cambridge Steam to shut off their oil- and gas-fired
boilers for much of the year. Since it currently costs
Cambridge Steam $10-11/thousand pounds to produce and
distribute steam, the $7 steam price used in these
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scenarios would make it attractive for Cambridge Steam
to purchase steam from the municipal waste recovery
facility.
Both Scenarios 1 and 2 are promising. Under both
ownership structures, neither plant would require
Cambridge and Somerville to pay higher tipping fees
over the twenty year period as a whole. The two
cities would thus benefit if either case was to mater-
ialize, and the cities can chose whether to go the pub-
lic ownership or private sector route.
Within this scenario group, if Somerville and Cam-
bridge prefer to own the plant, Scenario 1A is prefer-
able to Scenario 2A. While both scenarios pay off over
time, the first scenario shows a net savings in disposal
costs in the second year of operations. Under base case
conditions, Scenario 1A would offer the cities a net
tip fee that year of $15.33. As early as the fifth year
of operations, the cities could anticipate a tip fee of
$11.39--a 29% reduction from current costs. The tip
fees would continue to decrease through year 15, when
the modular is assumed to give out. Scenario 2A does
not show tip fees under $16 until its fourth year of
operation. The first year's tip fee would be as high
as $20.01. And while it offers tip fees under $16
for 17 out of the 20 years analyzed, these are the last
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17 years. The Cambridge/Somerville context will
probably not permit the cities to absorb the imme-
diate losses even if they promise greater savings
later on. Thus, if Somerville and Cambridge decide
to own the facility and find themselves operating
in this scenario group, Scenario 1A is the appro-
priate choice. If this is the case, the cities should
be prepared to absorb a $61,000 loss during the first
year of operation.
If Cambridge and Somerville, on the other hand,
choose to contract with a private company to build, own,
and operate the resource recovery facility within this
scenario group, then the waterwall plant of Scenario 2B
looks promising. Due to the relationship between capi-
tal costs and tax benefits discussed in the preceeding
results piece, the waterwall facility is expected to
generate a Net Present Value (NPV) of $9.1 million.
This is the highest NPV seen in this analysis, and could
translate into a constant $13.15/ton tipping fee for
twenty years, with healthy benefits to both the private
owner and the community. The low net tip fee that
could be offered provides some room for negotiation,
and it is likely that Somerville and Cambridge would
achieve savings on disposal expenses in every year
of the contract.
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It is conceivable that this situation of a lower
tip fee contract could come out of Scenario 1B as well,
but it is a marginal case. The plant will generate a
Net Present Value of $5.9 million, which under base case
conditions would translate into a tip fee of $14.22.
This leaves less room for negotiation about risk assump-
tion, and once the cities indicate their unwillingness
to absorb all the risks, this contracted tip fee is
likely to rise to close to $16. Moreover, Scenario 1A
looks better for the community than 1B, since in 1A by
year three the cities would experience a lower net tip
fee than the pre-risk contracted tip fee of 1B, and
the expense of going this route is only $61,000, worth
absorbing in this case.
Thus, under this scenario group, the financial
analysis has narrowed the range of choice for Cambridge
and Somerville to Scenario 1A or Scenario 2B.
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Scenarios 5-9
These scenarios also process the municipal solid waste
from both communities, but serve a Somerville Steam Loop.
The loop would link the resource recovery plant with the pro-
posed Somerville economic development area and some existing
industries, and the steam would be sold to the industries
the City is able to bring in there (the availability of
low-cost, reliable steam might attract the industries to the
site). Since the loop does not currently exist,this analysis
has considerable flexibility in setting the parameters to
best match steam supply to steam demand. Thus, these
scenarios included a 5 day/week operation, two 7-day/week
options, and two cogenerating possibilities.
Two factors make this set of scenarios look better from
a financial standpoint than their counterparts in the first
group which supplied steam to the Cambridge Steam Loop:
(1) the users are closer to the plant site, thus decreasing
the length of the pipe needed and the high capital costs
associated with that pipe; and (2) the expected industrial
process users purchase a higher overall percenta'ge of the
steam produced, as their needs are constant (they do not vary
with the ambient air temperature as do space conditioning
needs filled by the Cambridge Steam Loop).
Scenarios 6 and 8 are based on air-modular systems,
with 6 producing steam only and the Scenario 8 plant a
cogenerator. Scenarios 7 and 9 are waterwall plants,
101
producing steam only and steam/electricity respectively.
As mentioned earlier, the better financial picture
created with seven day operations caused Scenario 5 to
be eliminated from further consideration at this time.
Scenario 9 does the least well of the remaining
scenarios in this group. It shows negative cash flows
nearly every year due to the high capitl costs asso-
ciated with waterwalls and electricity-generating
equipment. Although some adjustments probably could
be made to bring the plant to the break-even level,
it seems fruitless to work on this one when the plant
has no unique benefits.
If cogeneration is the aim, Scenario 8 then becomes
the appropriate choice within this scenario group. In
fact, it is the only cogenerating scenario of the entire
set of 14 scenarios that works financially. Steam would
continue to be sold to the Somerville Steam Loop at the
same quantity as in the other scenarios in this group,
with the electricity sold to Boston Edison at their
full avoided cost. Thus, energy revenues in this scen-
ario would be higher than in the steam-only plants, since
the electricity sold represents a new revenue source
without sacrificing any of the steam income. The capital
costs for this plant are consequently $2.5 million
higher than they would be without the electricity-
generating capacity.
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Scenario 8 could be built under either ownership
structure and provide Cambridge and Somerville with
savings in their waste disposal costs. However, if the
cities find themselves operating within this scenario
group, Scenario 8 is not the best option from a finan-
cial standpoint in either ownership category--Scenario
6A generates lower tip fees every year than does
Scenario 8A, while the Net Present Value of Scenario 7B
and consequently its base negotiable tip fee, is better
than that found in 8B. Scenario 8 should be considered
only if Cambridge and Somerville wish to do cogeneration
for non-financial reasons such as certainty of some
energy sales due to federal protection of utility
purchase of electricity.
If this is the case, the financial analysis does
not shed much light on which ownership structure is
more appropriate--if the cities want to own it, the
first year tip fee would be $16.34, representing a
$26,000 deficit, but the next year's tip fee would be
$14.27 resulting in an effective $130,000 surplus.
The tip fee continues to fall through year 15, meaning
that public ownership would be feasible and profitable
if the cities could absorb the first year deficit.
If the private sector path is followed, the Net Present
Value generated could support a $14.51 contracted tip
fee. While this leaves some margin for negotiation
103
as to risk assumption, there is not that much of a
cushion before the tip fee rises to close to $16.
It is enough, however, to merit serious consideration
should Somerville and Cambridge prefer a private,
cogenerating plant.
For the two steam-only plants, the choice again rests
on the ownership decision that Cambridge and Somerville make.
Should public ownership be prefered, while Scenario 7A is
viable, Scenario 6A is better. Under 6A, the Cities could
experience tip fees as low as $12.76 during the first year
of operation. It would drop in the next year to $11.40 and
all the way down to $7.76, or a 52% reduction in current
costs, as early as year five. In all fifteen years of anti-
cipated plant life, in fact, the revenues from steam sales
would cause a reduction in tip fees for Cambridge and Somer-
ville, in this scenario. Scenario 7A would show tip fees
lower than $16 for nineteen of its twenty years. The first
year of operations would see a tip fee of $16.56, though,
with $14.69 the amount for the second year. While this
scenario would have total cost reductions greater than those
in Scenario 6A, the timing of the benefits minimizes its
viability in the Somerville/Cambridge, tight fiscal con-
straint context. Thus, for the public sector ownership
option within this scenario group, Scenario 6A represents
the best technology choice.
104
The situation is reversed for private ownership.
Here, Scenario 7B shows much more promise than Scenario
6B. Scenario 7B, in fact, generates a Net Present Value
of $15.3 million. This could be translated into a
possible contracted tip fee of $13.17. The size of the
tip fee indicates negotiating freedom for Cambridge
and Somerville, before they bargain away all of the
waste disposal savings. This plant would be likely to
generate significant private sector interest, given its
high Net Present Value and consequent room for maneuver.
If Somerville and Cambridge choose the supply and
demand conditions bonding this scenario group, then,
they have several positive options from which to
choose--Scenarios 6A, 7B, 8A, or 8B. Deciding among
these promising scenarios is a matter of weighing
other community values--including ownership and energy
product preferences--with the findings presented here.
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YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 1 7 U 9 t0 11 12 13 14 15 14 17 to 19 20
PRIVATE
PROP TX 73000 73000 13000 73 13000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 0 109000 109000 3000 19000
NMT FEE 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000 225000
CFIT 64657 193707 315451 430305 538657 640876 737310 8282B4 914110
REN PRIN 14282448 14005976 13685268 13313247 12881702 12381110 11800424 11126828 10345456
*+AMTZ 276472 320708 372021 431545 500592 580686 673596 781372 906391
DEPR BASE 11250000 9437500 6328125 4746094 3559570 2373047 1186523 0 0
--DEPR 2812500 2109375 1582031 1186523 1186523 1186523 1186523 1186523 0
REAL ANTZ 246059 269273 294676 322475 352897 386190 422623 462493 506124
TAXED Y -2501783 -1646396 -971904 -433743 -294969 -159457 -26591 104254 1420234
995077 1071461 1143521 1211503 1275637
9439065 8387652 7168012 5753230 4112083
1051414 1219640 1414782 1641147 1903731
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
553872 606124 663305 725881 794360
1548948 1677584 1806826 1937384 2069997
1979750 -1425000 -1534000 -1534000 -1534000 -1534000
2208352 0 0 0 0 0
2208328 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
869300
2849050 -1425000 -1534000 -1534000 -1534000 -1534000
TAX OWED -1150820 -757342 -447076 -199522 -135686 -73350 -12232 47957 653307 712516 771689 831140 891197 952199 1310563 -655500 -705640 -705640 -705640 -705640
ITC 1039500
ETC 562500
ST TAX -43781 -28812 -17006 -7591 -5162 -2791 -465 1824 24854 27107 29358 31619 33904 36225 49858 -24938 -26845 -26845 -26845 -26845
NET TAI -2796601 -786154 -464084 -207112 -140848 -76141 -12697 49781 678162 739623 801047 862760 925101 988423 1360421 -680438 -732485 -732485 -732485 -732485
CFAT 2861259 979861 779536 637417 679505 717017 750007 778503 235948 255454 270414 280762 286402 287213 619329 -744563 -801515 -801515 -801515 -801515
N'9 5981373
ET TIP 14.51
C.-i
tlj
0
0
tri
H
t1-
t-,
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Scenarios 10-11
These scenarios are the Somerville-only ones, processing
only Somerville's municipal solid waste and serving customers
on the Somerville Steam Loop. They are smaller plants,
about one-half the size of their counterparts in the other
scenario groups. The systems are air-modular, since to be
viable waterwall plants require greater economies of scale
than these scenarios vrovide.
The scenarios in this aroup tend to be on the expensive
side to operate. Since they are smaller, they have less of
a revenue and exoense stream over which to spread the capital
costs. Nonetheless, they have lower capital costs due to
the smaller plant size required.
The major difference between the plants in Scenarios 10
and 11 is the level of operation. Scenario 10 would operate
on a 5-day/week schedule, so was removed from further consid-
eration as discussed in the earlier part of this section.
Scenario 11 is possible from a financial perspective
should Somerville decide to go it alone, but not terribly
encouraging. In the case of public ownership, the plant
would generate high tip fees in the first two years of
operation--$19.12 and $17.34--and only go down to $15.66
in the third year. This third year fee is just under Somer-
ville's current rate of $15.70/ton. The City would have
to wait four years to see any mentionable savings while
absorbing a problematic deficit for the first two years.
The tip fees would keep falling through year fifteen, so
115
would generate benefit when examined with a long time
horizon that is unlikely to be a luxury Somerville can
afford. Under private ownership, however, the antici-
pated contract tip fee is $15.54--low enough to offer
some savings for Somerville, but close enough to
$15.70 to offer no negotiating room.
Thus, while Somerville could build a viable
resource recovery plant, if Somerville can combine
with Cambridge forces they are both better off.
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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 I5 16 17 18 19 20
PRIVATE
PROP TI 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000
Mf6T FEE 100900 100800 100900 100800 100000 100800 100800 100800
73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 73000 0 0 0 0 0
100800 100800 100900 100800 100800 100800 100800 100800 100900 100800 100800 100800
-100387 -50644 -3711 40553 82318 121719 158890 193956 227038 258247 287690 315466 341670 366390 778400 -638400 -638400 -638400 -638400 -638400
REM PRIN 6553850 6426984 6279819 6109109 5911084 5681375 5414913 5105818
'+ANTI 126866 147165 170711 198025 229709 266462 309096 358551
DEPR BASE 5000000 3750000 2812500 2109375 1582031 054688 527344 0
"-DEPR 1250000 937500 703125 527344 527344 527344 527344 527344
REAL AMTZ 112910 123562 135219 147976 161935 177212 193931 212226
TAXED Y -1237477 -864582 -571623 -338815 -283090 -228412 -174523 -121161
TA QW(D -569239 -397708 -262947 -155855 -130221 -105070 -80281 -55734
It 47700)
IETC 250000
ST TAX -21656 -15130 -10003 -5929 -4954 -3997 -3054 -2120
MET TAX -1317895 -412838 -272950 -161784 -135175 -109067 -83335 , -57855
CfAT 1217508 362194 269233 202337 217494 230786 242225 251811
NPV
MET TiP
4747266 4331347
415919 482466
0 0
0 0
232247 254157
459285 512405
3848880
559661
0
0
278134
565824
3289219
649207
0
0
304374
619839
2640012
753090
0
0
333088
674758
1886932 1013360 0
873573 1013344 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
364511 398899
730902 1177299 -638400
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-638400 -638400 -638400 -638400
211271 235706 260279 285126 310389 336215 541558 -293664 -293664 -293664 -293664 -293664
8037 8967
219309 244673
7729 13574
9902
270181
17509
10847
295973
19493
11808
322197
19473
12791 20603 -11172 -11172
34906 562160 -304836 -304836
17385 216240 -333564 -333564
-11172
-304836
-333564
-11172
-304836
-333564
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0
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0
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2033867
15.54
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This section, then, discussed the conclusions reached
in the financial analysis of a resource recovery facility
for the selected site. The chart of the following pages
summarizes the cash flow findings for the remaining options.
The next part of this section will illustrate the analytic
process behind those conclusions by describing the reasoning
used in developing the base case. The following chapter
will assess the uncertainties associated with resource
recovery by analyzing the value of the risks that will be
assumed by project participants. In this manner, the piece
will orovide guidelines for Somerville and Cambridge in
their negotiating processes.
NET TIP FEES
En FIRST FIVE YEARS ($)
-4 fd
o u
SaYEAR 1 2 3 4 5 NET PRESENT VALUE*
U) Un
ci) md
SCENARIO in millions
1A 16.81 15.33 13.94 12.63 11.39
B 14..22 14.22 14.22 14.22 14.22 5.9 mil.
-W~ 0 0Q) o 2A 20.01 18.04 16.18 14.42 12.77
B 13.24 13.24 13.24 13.24 13.24 9.1
S 6A 12.76 11.40 10.11 8.90 7.76
C) In E% IB 14.53 14.53 14.53 14.53 14.53 5.2
.Hd U) 7A 16.56 14.69 12.92 11.26 9.69
- B 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 13.17 8.8
0
8A 16.34 14.27 12.32 10.48 8.74
Un > 0
- B 14.51 14.51 14.51 14.51 14.51 6.0
$h4
-d 11A 19.12 17.34 15.66 14.07 12.58
u PB 15.54 15.54 15.54 15.54 15.54 2.0
.~ 4.
Z ~*NOTE: Private sector ownership only
Soo U) 0
0 -P
0) Cd U
. Q ) U)
E4 >1 $4I
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NOTES
1. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, Solid Waste
Management Consulting Firm, March 11, 1982.
2. Conservation with John Culp, CSI, February 17, 1982.
3. Sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utilities Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978.
4. See Base Case Assumptions, Section III.
5. Holm, Phillip, (Senior Partner, Chapman and Cutler)
"Ownership and Tax Considerations," Proceedings of Re-
source Recovery Financing Conference, United States Con-
ference of Mayors and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., March 29-30, 1982.
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Base Case Assumptions
In exploring the financial feasibility of a resource
recovery plant, much of the analysis must depend on hypo-
thetical values, since the field is developing and chan-
ging so quickly. Nonetheless, there is enough history
to support a schedule of expected values for each vari-
able in the financial analysis. The sensitivity of the
outcomes to the values of the variables will be tested
in the next chapter. What follows here is a descrip-
tion of the rationale used in developing the "base
case"--or expected values.
The base case scenarios were developed for a twenty
year span. However, the modular facilities have a shorter
life expectancy than do the waterwalls. While the 15
and 20 year lives used by the financial community may
be conservative, the ratio is correct; so the assumptions
are based on these useful lifetimes. Rather than make
assumptions about the decisions the cities would make in
Year 16, when the modular units become inoperable, this
analysis simply calculated the cost of disposal without
any compensating energy revenues.
The -twenty year projections assume the construction
and start-up period have already taken place, and that
Year 1 on the charts represents the first year of oper-
ations. In other words, for the modular scenarios,
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Year 1 is really Year 3 in terms of the debt service
payment. Similarly, for the waterwall units, Year 1
is really the project's Year 4.
All items are presented in 1981 dollars. It is assumed
that all costs and revenues will rise at the same rate of gen-
eral inflation, so that relative costs and revenues remain
constant. The debt service payment, however, will remain con-
stant in nominal dollars, so it will change in value over time
relative to the other costs and revenues. A six per cent
rate of inflation was assumed, which is.lower than current and
recent historical rates. Thus a 6% deflator was applied to
the annual debt service payment. A description of terms
and how they were calculated follows.
REVENUES
The -next few items are the information needed to calculate
the revenue stream provided by tip fees, and steam and elec -
tric sales.
Tip Fees: Somerville pays $15.70 a ton to "tip" its trash
while Cambridge pays $18.65 per ton to have its trash taken
from its transfer station. Other area communities' tip fees
as of July 1981 were: Medford--16.12/ton; Everett--$16.12;
Chelsea--$16.12; Nwwton--$18.50, and Waltham--$18.50.
There are many small landfills in the area, but only two
landfills within proximity are large enough to handle either
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Somerville's or Cambridge's trash now, or the residue from a
waste-to-energy plant. These landfills are located in Plain-
2
ville and Peabody. Using the BFI/Plainville price and the
other municipal tipping fees as indicators, area tip fees at
these landfills would range from $16.00 to $18.00/ton.
The $16.00/ton tip fee used in this analysis , although
$.30 higher than Somerville's current rate, is a conservative
estimate of alternative disposal costs. The tip fee is
included as a revenue item, because the financial projec-
tions are done from the perspective of the plant operator.
Should Somerville and Cambridge own and operate the plant,
the tip fee might be a paper transfer only, but would
measure the cost of the waste disposal to the two cities.
Massachusetts law has set a $1.00/ton host fee for
resource recovery facilities.3 If non-Somerville/Cambridge
trash were processed by the plant, the additional income
from host fees could be used to offset Somerville and
Cambridge tipping fees. However, the facility's design
capacity includes only a small margin above the total
Cambridge and Somerville trash load, so no host fees
were assumed in this analysis.
Tonnage: Somerville generates about 35,000 tons/year
of trash from its residential sector and some commercial
establishments. Cambridge residents plus some businesses
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generate about 40,000 tons/year. The 7-5,000 ton total was
the quantity used here.
Tip $: Tipping income is the revenue gained through the
tipping of refuse. It is simply the number of tons dumped
times the tipping fee.
Steam Price: Steam price indicates the delivered price
of 1000 lbs of steam. It implies the cost of the production
and distribution equipment, operations and maintenance.
This figure can be understood in tww ways-- steam production
and energy work. In terms of steam production, COM/ELEC
Cambridge Steam Co. (Cambridge Steam Co. in the text) es-
timates that it costs them $8-9.00 in fuel and a total of
$12.00 including all costs to deliver 1000 lbs of steam. -
Cambridge Steam Co. estimates natural gas costs to total
$10.00/1000 lbs of steam and oil costs to top $13.50/1000 lbs
4
steam.
In terms of energy work, one thousand pounds of steam has
approximately 1,000,000 BTUs. The Department of Energy's
Energy Information Administration's Monthly Energy Review,
(February, 1982) prices oil at $5.12 and gas at $3.01
5
per million BTU delivered to steam/electric utilities. These
are national averages which are to be increased for New
England. Dr. Gilberto *Russo of MIT's Energy Lab estimates
oil and gas costs at $6.50 and $5.50 per million BTU, respec-
tively.6 Boiler equipment and distribution costs must be
added to calculate equivalent steam delivered energy costs
for heating and process uses.
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The $7.00/1000 pounds of steam represents a figure
which is competitive with oil and gas equivalents for
comparable energy uses, and is also below the cost of
the fuel needed for Cambridge Steam Company to produce
its steam. This steam price is meant to be a benchmark
for comparison for Cambridge Steam Company's direct
purchase of the steam for its East Cambridge Steam Loop,
or for the delivery of steam for heating and process
needs to existing and potential Somerville businesses.
Steam price can be varied by the plant operators.
As a rule, steam prices at waste-to-energy plants are
currently about 10% less than the competing fossil
fuel price.
Steam Quantity: Steam quantity is a function of the
quantity of refuse processed and the plant technology.
Modular combustion units of the size and efficiency
considered here produce about-4700 pounds of steam per
ton of trash. Waterwall incinerators have higher ef-
ficiencies (68% as compared to 60% in modular systems),
and so produce about 5000 pounds of steam per ton of
trash.7
In the seven day/week operation, the plant is shut down
8
for~naintenance and repairs for one two-week period. These
scenarios account for two weeks lost steam production. The
purchased steam quantity used in this analysis is 90% for
the Cambrbge Loop and 95% for the Somerville Loop -- of
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the total steam produced. This percentage is meant to ac-
count for unscheduled downtimes and distribution losses.
The quality of steam demanded differs for the Cambridge
and Somerville Steam Loops. Cambridge Steam Loop currently
delivers steam at 200 psig, 480*F. This is a hich
quality superheated steam. If the waste-to-energy plant were
to supply the Cambridge loop, it would have to supply steam
at this pressure and temperature. Due to a loss of indus-
rial customers, most of the Cambridge steam is now used for
heating purposes. Demands vary throughout the year from. a
high of approximately 70,000/1000 lbs per hour in the winter
to a low of about 30,000/1000 lbs per hour in the summer.
The proposed resource recovery facility would produce about
40,000/ 1000 lbs per hour. If the plant supplied the Cam-
bridge loop base load, about 90% of the steam produced on an
annual basis would be used.
The quality of steam needed for the food processors and
bulk packagers on the Somerville Loop is estimated to
be 100 psig, saturated. This is lower quality steam
that may also be more suitable for heating purposes
than superheated steam, and for electricity production
given boiler upgrading to produce initial higher
quality steam.
Electric $: Electric revenue is the income gained
from the sale of electricity. Generating capacity,
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operating hours and the price of electricity determine
the electric revenue figure.
Andrew Levine, a mechanical engineer at Thermo-
Electron, calculated the constant amounts of electricity
produced in several different situations.9 The key facts
are the inlet and outlet pressure and temperature of
the steam into the turbo-generator. In this analysis,
to produce electricity, the steam produced is assumed
to be 600 psig, 590*F, a high quality superheated steam.
When this steam is run through the electricity-producing
turbines, its outlet temperature and pressure can be made
to fit its demand. If only electricity and no steam is
produced, the greatest amount of energy can be taken out
of the steam, 600 psig to 1 psig, thus producing the
most electricity. To deliver steam to the Cambridge
Loop, the steam enters the turbine at 600 psig superheated
and exits at 200 psig saturated. Cambridge Steam Loop
currently supplies superheated 200 psig steam. Therefore
the steam has to be reheated before it can go into the
Cambridge Steam system. This process requires additional
equipment and energy to make electricity production in
this scenario for practical purposes infeasible.
On the other hand, to supply the Somerville Loop
the steam is dropped from 600 psig, saturated steam to
the 100 psig, saturated level. As the steam does not
need to be reheated to meet demand requirements, this
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is a relatively effective electricity-producing scenario
group. The constant electricity production rates for
these scenarios are .0664 for all electricity and
.0241 for Somerville Steam Loop demands as well.
These constant rates are multiplied by the amount
of steam to estimate the kilowatt hours or electri-
city produced. For example:
kwh = # 1000 lbs/hr steam x .0664
According to the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities, the price of electricty produced depends upon the
time of day it is delivered to the grid. The price
would be about 70/kwh at peak times and about 40/kwh off
10
peak for Boston Edison. Peak hours are from 8am to 10pm
weekdays. All other hours, holidays and weekends are off
peak times. In order to calculate electricity revenue, the
number of peak and off peak hours that the plant is operating
must be determined. Electric revenues," then, is the # of
kwh multiplied by the number of peak and off peak hours,
which is in turn mnultiplied by their respective prices.
Electric revenue = 3000 peak hours x $.07 x kwh + 4300
off peak hours x $.04 x kwh
Total: Total operating income equals annual tip, steam
and electric revehues.
EXPENSES
The next items represent the annual costs of operating
and maintaining the plant.
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Auxiliary Fuel: An article by Ross Hofmann in the
September 1981 Public Works Magazine compares the expense
items of several modular units. The mean auxiliary
fuel costs for seven-day operating facilities worked
out to be just under $2.75/ton of refuse handled.
U.S. Department of Energy information indicates that
auxiliary fuel costs are $1 to $4/ton. The figure used
in this analysis for seven-day modular operations is
$2.75/ton. For a five-day modular operation, the
auxiliary fuel cost is $3.40--about 25% more. This
increase is meant to cover the greater operating and
start-up fluctuations in a five-day operating schedule.
Waterwall plants deliver 95% of the energy needed
for their operations. Thus, 5% of the steam produced
is generated from auxiliary fuels, usually oil or gas.
To calculate the auxiliary fuel costs, 5% of the steam
produced is multiplied by $8.00, the BTU-equivalent
price for oil.
O and M: Operating and maintenance costs are the
largest annual expenditures in waste-to-energy facilities
other than the debt service payment. Waterwall incin-
erators have lower costs than modular systems. The
Hofmann article in Public Works Magazine also shows
a range of operating and maintenance costs from about
$9 to $11.50/ton for seven-day modular units. The
figure used in this analysis is $10/ton for modular and
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$8/ton for waterwall plants. When a facility produces
electricity as well as steam, $2/ton is added to cover
the service costs of the electrical generating equipment.
Ash Disposal: Although refuse is reduced to 3-5% of
its volume through incineration, it is only reduced
25-30% of its original weight.11 Unfortunately for
the waste-to-energy operator, landfills accept refuse
on the basis of tonnage rather than volume.
Thirty percent of the total processed tonnage is
multiplied by $18/ton, approximately the BFI/Plainville
price--one of the highest in the area. The ash disposal
expense then has downtime components added in. The
amount of trash collected during the scheduled two
week downtime is multiplied by $18/ton and added to
the ash disposal figure. There is no two week down-
time scheduled with a five-day operation, as main-
tenance is conducted on the weekends. Together the
residue and downtime disposal figures equal the total
ash disposal costs.
CASH FLOW BEFORE FINANCING
This item is the total annual revenue minus the total
annual expenses. It is as titled, the cash flow before the
financing expenses of the capital are paid.
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CAPITAL COST
Whereas the revenue and expense items describe annual
operating cash flows, the capital cost items describe the
one-time costs of the physical plant itself.
Plant Cost per Ton. Capital costs for modular plants
are lower than for equivalent waterwall ones. Northern Energy
Company estimates that the capital cost/ton design capacity
12
for modular facilities is $30,000 to $35,000. CSI, a solid
waste management consulting firm estimates these costs to be
a little higher. A literature review of the modular plants
built shows capital costs/ton installed capacity of $20,000
13
to $30,000. Based on this information, the compromise figure
used in this analysis is $30,000/ton design capacity.
Waterwall plants' capital costs, because they are site-
built, are harder to pin down. Northern Energy Co. estimates
14
these costs to be $50,000 to $55,000/ton capacity. A repre-
sentative from Camp, Dresser, and McKee, an environmental
engineering firm, thoug&t that the Northern Energy Company
figures were understated, but that the waterwall would cost
15
less than double the capital cost of a modular system. A
literature review shows a wide range of costs below these
figures. Based on this iformation, the figure used in this
analysis is $50,000/ton design capacity.
Plant Size. The plant size listed is a function of how
many tons of trash per day the resource recovery facility can
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handle. The total annual number of tons is divided by
the number of days per year that the plant is to operate.
A 7-day plant would operate 350 days each year, and a
-day plant only about 250 days/year. This figure is then
multiplied by the expected- percentage of operating time,
taking into consideration scheduled and unscheduled down-
time. A 5-day/week plant has approximately a 95% opera-
ting on-time, a 7-day facility has expected operating on-
time of 85%.16 These daily tonnage capacity figures were
then rounded up to the nearest reasonable unit size.
Plant $: The total cost of the plant is equal to
the cost/ton capacity times plant size.
Site $: The two specified sites are the Cambridge
and Somerville municipal solid waste transfer stations.
At the Somerville site, the tipping bay, pit, and shell
including foundation and stack remain from the old in-
cinerator. It may be possible to save the foundation,
tipping bay, and pit to build the waste-to-energy plant
whether it is a modular or waterwall.
CSI and Camp, Dresser, and McKee estimate the site prepa-
17
ration costs to range from $200,000 to $500,000. With these
estimates in mind and the possibility of using some portion of
the existing structure, the site.preparation figure used is
$300,000. This cost includes the price for the land which
is assumed to be made available by either municipality, the
owners, for some minimal cost. The $300,000 figure is used
for either site.
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Pipe Cost per Foot. The steam produced from the waste-
to-energy plant is to be delivered to either the Cambridge
Steam Loop or to the proposed Somerville economic development
area and adjacent present steam users. The cost of the pipe
per foot, including the condensate return line, can vary from
as little as $200/foot to as much as $1000+/foot, depending on
site characteristics. All estimates are for underground
pipes. Bob Pierce, Chief Mechanical Engineer at Commonwealth
Electric, believes that a steam line could be installed from
the Somerville site along the railroad tracks to
an eventual hook-up to the present Cambridge Steam Loop.
18
He estimates installed pipe costs at around $300/foot. Dr.
Karnitz of Oak Ridge National Laboratory estimates the cost
19per foot of steam pipe installed at $500/foot in urban areas.
On the other hand, CSI prices the pipe at $1000+/foot in
urban areas. 20
In the case of running the pipe in Cambridge, placing
pipe along the railroad tracks would be less expensive than
under city streets. In Somerville, the pipe would either
be placed under primarily vacant land or installed when road
improvements are beinq done for the economic dex lopment
area. Thus, the cost used in this analysis is $500/foot.
Pipe Length. For a plant located at the Somerville site,
the length of the pipe to the Cambridge Steam Loop is
about 4000 feet along the railroad tracks, and 2500 feet to
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service the Boynton Yards. A plant built at the Cambridge
site needs 750 feet of pipe to connect to the Cambridge Steam
Loop.
Pipe $. The cost of the pipe is a function of pipe cost
per foot times pipe length.
Electric Plant Costs. Very few steam-to-electric waste-
to-energy plants have been built in the United States. The
capital costs vary greatly to upgrade the boilers and for the
electricity producing equipment--turbines, generators, hook-
ups of these facilities. Based on the costs of the recently-
completed Windham, Connecticut cogenerating resource recovery
plant, Dr. Allen White of the Northern Energy Company prices
the additional capital cost at 10-12% of the capital cost for
21
the steam production plant. Ouellet of CSI uses a capital
cost of 15-20% of the steam plant plus an additional $1000
22
per kilowatt of electricity produced. Pentti Aalto of Pequod
Associates estimates these costs to be 30-40% of steam plant
23
capital. In this analysis, the electric plant capital costs
are based on adding 20% of the steam plant costs plus $1000/
kilowatt hour of electric capacity.
Total Cap. This figure is the sum of all the capital
costs. It is a one-time cost from which the bond issue is
figured.
EQUITY
If the plant is to be privately owned, at least 25% of
the cost of the facility's capital must be raised as equity.
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This equity portion is the minimum that must be invested
in order to derive plant ownership and thus enjoy the profits
and tax benefits of the plant's operation.
BOND ISSUE
The bond issue must include enough money to cover not
only the capital cost of building the facility, but also
interest payments during construction, required construction
reserve and contingency funds, and legal and engineering
fees. High interest rates raise the level of money that must
be borrowed, as the various set-aside funds are calculated
according to the interest rate at which money is borrowed.
CSI estimates that the bond should be issued at 1.4 times
24
the capital cost to cover all other expense items. Other
consultants estimate higher amounts are necessary--as
much as twice as high in some cases.25 A 1.7 ratio of
capital funds required to bond issue is used in this
analysis. If an equity contribution [or grant] is in-
cluded, this amount is subtracted from the amount of
capital needed before the size of the bond is figured.
Inflation: The inflation rate used is 6%, as dis-
cussed in the introduction to this section.
Interest Rate: The method by which the project is
financed determines the interest rate within the range
set by the general financial market.. Bonding rates
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for general obligation bonds in Somerville and Cambridge
are about 12-12.5% now, according to City officials. 2 6
To be conservative, we used 14% as the interest rate in
the base case.
If the project is financed in the private market, the
likely interest rate is 16%, as measured against alternative
investment opportunities such as money market funds.
Term. The term of the bond depends upon the useful life
of the facility, the financial community's familiarity with
the project, and the time required for start-up and construc-
tion. For modular facilities, plant life estimates of 15
year have been accepted for bonding purposes, construction/
start-up at two years. For waterwall facilities, plant life
is estimated at 20 years , construction/start-up at 3 years.
(These figures were from the Northern Energy Company.) The
term of the bond is 17 and 23 years respectively for modular
and waterwall facilities.
Annual Debt Service Payment. Debt service payment is
a function of the amount of money borrowed, the interest rate
at which it is borrowed, and the term of the bond or loan.
At the end of the bond's term, the total of the annual debt
service payments will have paid off the entire amount bor-
rowed plus interest. On the charts, it is calculated in 4
steps--reading "form" for formula. The aggregate formula is:
d * (BI)
d = 1 - (1+i)-t
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where d = debt service payment
i = interest rate
t = term
BI = Bond Issue
As mentioned earlier, this was deflated at a 6%/year rate:
where n = year
(1 + .0 6 )n-1
Reserve Rate. A debt service reserve fund equal to one
year's debt service payment is required in all waste-to-energy
projects. This reserve fund is invested and the interest
gains of the investment provide additional revenue each year.
In this analysis, it is assumed that the reserve fund would
be invested at prevailing market rates, estimated earlier
to be 16%.
Reserve Income. The reserve income is the amount of
interest gained from the investment of the reserve fund. It
is calculated by multiplying the annual debt service payment
times the interest rate (16% here) at which the reserve fund
is invested.
Capital Payment. The capital payment is the effective
payment on the debt. It is the annual debt service payment
minus the income gained on the investment of the reserve
fund. Note that in the last year of the loan, the capital
payment is zero. The reserve income equals the amount of
debt service as it has been reserved for this purpose.
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CASH FLOW AFTER FINANCING
Cash flow after financing is the cash flow before
financing minus the capital payment. This is the final
cash flow for a publically-owned project.
Net Tip Fee (Public). This is the amount the community'
will pay for total annual solid waste disposal costs divided
by the number of tons processed that year. It is calculated
with the following formula:
$16 - (Cash Flow After Financing)n
(tonnage) 
n
where n = year
It is a relevant measure only in the case of public
ownership.
Private Ownership Factors--all of the items that follow
apply in the case of private ownership only.
Property Tax: According to the Assessor's Office in each
city, the 1982 property tax rate/$1000 value is $246.82 in
Somerville 27and $199.80 in Cambridge.28 Somerville property
is at 25-30% valuation, and Cambridge property is valued at
28%. Both Cities expect to be at 100% valuation within a
year. The Cambridge Assessor's Office estimates that the
property tax at this time would be about $37/$1000 value.
Using this same ratio in Somerville, the estimated property
tax at 100% valuation will be about $46/$1000 value. However,
due to Proposition 2 , the maximum tax rate is $25/$1000,
unless there is a local override. In Cambridge, an override
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of Proposition 2 recently passed for this year, so that
a $37/$1000 tax rate is used in this analysis. In Somer-
ville an override has not occured. Instead, it has to
cut back its municipal expenses each year by 15% until
it reaches the $25/1000 tax rate. In Somerville, then,
the Proposition 2 maximum rate is assumed.
The property tax amount is a function of the market
value of the building structure and steam pipe only.
CSI estimates that the cost is $50-100/foot for the building
29
structure. This analysis uses $75/foot. A typical size for
waste-to-energy plants of the capacity needed to handle the
waste stream of Somerville and Cambridge is 150' X 150'.
The pipe serving the Somerville loop is assumed to be
taxed at the Proposition 2 maximum rate. The pipe serving
the Cambridge loopis taxed partially in Somerville -and
in Cambridge. The property tax of the Somerville loop pipe
equals the cost of the pipe times the Somerville tax rate.
For the Cambridge loop, it is assumed that 25% of the pipe
is taxed in Somerville and 75% in Cambridge.
Thus, for the scenarios where the Cambridge Loop is the
energy customer, the property tax for the plant and pipe is
$110,000, and for the Somerville loop at $73,000.
Management Fee. This is the private operator's profit
margin. This analysis uses the CSI estimate of $3.00/ton
30
of trash handled.
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CASH FLOW BEFORE TAXES
Cash Flow Before Taxes (CFBT) is the amount left after
property taxes, management fees are deducted from the
Cash Flow After Financing.
Remaining Principal: Remaining principal is the amount
of the bond left to be paid after each year's debt
service payment minus the interest content of that pay-
ment. The debt service figure is a total of the annual
interest payments plus the repayment of principal.
In the early years of a project, the lion's share of
the debt service payment goes to interest. As time
goes on, an increasing portion is going to repay the
principal. The formula for calculating the portion going
to principal follows:
DSP = d. + d ; TP (TI) = x ; DSP - x = d. ;
1 p1
TP - d = RP ; and RP (TI) = 2
where DSP = debt service payment;
d.= interest portion of DSP;
d p=principal portion of DSP;
TP = total principal
TI = total interest rate
RP = remaining principal.
Modular and waterwall facilities have 17 and 23
year bond terms respectively. This analysis picks up the
principal remaining in the first year of plant operation
after the 2 and 3 year construction period.
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Amortization: Amortization is the amount of the
principal paid each year. It is added onto the cash
flow before taxes because not all of the debt service
payment may be deducted as an expense by the plant
onwer, for federal and state tax purposes. Only the
interest payment is a legitimate deduction, so by ad-
ding back the amortization, one in effect reduces the
debt service payment deduction to the interest portion
only.
Depreciable Base: Buildings and equipment have lim-
ited useful lives, thus diminishing value over time.
Depreciation is used for tax purposes to account for
the implied expense of using the equipment over time.
Since land is not a depreciable item, the site prepara-
tion item must be deducted from total capital costs to
arrive at the depreciable base.
Depreciation: The different parts of the waste-to-
energy facility have varying useful lives for tax pur-
poses, and as such have different depreciation schedules.
This analysis uses an 8-year double declining rate used
by Northern Energy Company and CSI to average the dif-
fering rates. This schedule means that the entire
plant is depreciated in 8 years. The result is sub-
stantial tax benefits in the early years of operation.
A declining rate is used for the first four years and
a straightline rate for the remaining four, which provides
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for the maximum allowable depreciation benefits.
Real Amortization: Since amortization is based on the
debt service, which remains fixed in nominal dollars,
this item is the discounted value of the amortization
amount.
Taxed Income: Taxable income is the figure upon
which state and federal tax determinations are based.
It is the cash flow before taxes plus "real" amorti-
zation minus depreciation.
Taxes Owed: Tax owed is the percentage of taxable
income owed to the government. It is calculated by
multiplying the appropriate tax rate times taxable in-
come. According to the Internal Revenue Service,
46% of taxable income is to be paid by corporations
with income of $100,000 or more. This is the tax
rate used.
Investment Tax Credit: A one-time investment tax
credit (ITC) of 10% of capital cost is available.
Although usually limited to the amount "at risk",
since this is an energy project the project sponsor
is entitled to the ITC for the entire cost as long as
25% equity is invested. We calculated the ITC as
follows: .10 X (Plant Cost + Pipe Cost) = ITC.
This amount is deducted from the amount of taxes
owed for the first year.
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Business Energy Tax Credit: Waste-to-energy facili-
ties are eligible for the one-time BETC, worth 10% of
the project cost. However, those projects financed in
part by tax exempt bonds are only eligible for a 5%
credit on 90% of the project. We assumed a bond might
be used, so granted only the 5% credit. It is figured
by multiplying the depreciable base times .05. This
credit, like the ITC, is deducted from the taxes owed
during the first year of plant operations.
State Tax: Massachusetts income taxes on corpora-
tions is 10.75% of taxable income.
Net Tax: Net taxes owed equals tax owed minus the
investment and business energy tax credits plus state
tax.
CASH FLOW AFTER TAXES.
This is the amount each year left over after all
revenues are collected and expenses paid. It is a
function of the cash flow before taxes minus the
net tax.
Net Present Value: The net present value is the
sum of the 20 years' annual cash flow after taxes dis-
counted at the interest rate at which the money to
finance the project was borrowed, minus the inflation
rate assumed.
147
NET TIP FEE
This calculates the tip fee that a private owner
could contract to charge and still make a 30% return
on the equity. The formulas used are:
ROE =
NPV - eq
eq
where ROE = return on equity
NPV = net present value
eq = equity
Therefore, for a 30% ROE:
.3 eq + eq = NPVneeded
NPV dd - NPV = excess
s
where NPV =NPV achieved
s in Scenario
So, possible
(If
change in tip fees
excess value
20
wn
n=1
where wt= waste processed
in year n
and
value
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Therefore, Net Tip Fee equals:
(.3 eq + eq) - NPV
$16 + 2020 '
Z wn
n=1
ROE was chosen as the measure of return since it is a commonly
used measure in the resource recovery financing field, accor-
ding to participants at a U.S. Conference of Mayors
Conference on Resource Recovery Financing, held March
29 and 30, 1982.
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NOTES
1. Conversation with Dave Reilly, Commissioner, Somer-
ville Department of Public Works, February 23, 1982.
2. Conversation with Mary Mylie, Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Envrionmental Management, Solid Waste Section,
March 10, 1982.
3. Massachusetts General Law, Chapter III, Section 150A.
4. Conversation with Bob Pierce, Chief Mechnical Engine-
er, Commonwealth Electric Company, March 12, 1982.
5. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy
Review, United States Department of Energy, February 1982.
6. Conversation with Dr. Gilberto Russo, Energy Labor-
atory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 11,
1982.
7. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, Solid Waste
Management Consulting Firm, March 11, 1982.
8. Conversation with John Culp, CSI, Solid Waste
Management Consulting Firm, February 17, 1982.
9. Conversation with Andy Levine, Mechnical Engineer,
Thermo-Electron, March 9-11, 1982.
10. Conversation with Doug Short, Cogeneration Spe-
cialist, Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities,
March 8, 1982. Figures based upon February to April
Boston Edison rates.
11. Conversation with John Culp, CSI, February 17, 1982.
12. Conversation with Dr. Allen White, Northern Energy
Company, Boston, MA, March 9, 1982.
13. Garcia, Joseph, Management Services, Department,
Resource Recovery Installations Data Book, The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, October 1978.
14. Conversation with Dr. Allen White, Northern
Energy Company, March 9, 1982.
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Engineering and Planning Consulting Firm, Boston, MA,
March 9, 1982.
16. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, March 11, 1982.
17. Conversation with Jim Fife, Camp, Dresser & McKee,
March 9, 1982; Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI,
March 11, 1982.
18. Conversation with Bob Pierce, Commonwealth Electric
Company, March 12, 1982.
19. Conversation with Dr. Mike Karnitz, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February 19,
1982.
20. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, March 11, 1982.
21. Conversation with Dr. Allen White, Northern Energy
Corporation, March 9, 1982.
22. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, March 11, 1982.
23. Conversation with Penti Aalto, Pequod Associates,
Energy Engineering and Management Consulting Firm, Boston,
MA, March 9, 1982.
24. Conversation with John Culp, CSI, February 17, 1982.
25. Resource Recovery Financing Conference, United
States Conference of Mayors and United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, March 27-28, 1982.
26. Conversation with Richard Fahlander, Cambridge
Community Development Department, February 16, 1982.
27. City of Somerville's Assessor's Office.
28. City of Cambridge's Assessor's Office.
29. Conversation with Dave Ouellet, CSI, March 11, 1982.
30. ibid.
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Project Financing Decisions
The previous sections of this report determined that
a waste-to-energy facility to serve Somerville and/or
Cambridge is in fact technically and financially feasible.
The cities are faced with two related decisions before
the project can proceed--the ownership structure and the
method of financing. Once ownership and financing choices
are made, then the assumption of risk associated with
project development and operation can be negotiated within
this framework. This section presents the factors
involved in the public versus private ownership and
financing decisions, the risks, and other issues which
are negotiated surrounding the development and opera-
tion of a resource recovery plant.
Public versus Private Ownership
Before a financing plan can be developed, Cambridge
and Somerville must define the plant's ownership structure.
Public and private ownership each offer unique advantages
and disadvantages. In addition to the plant's financial
feasibility as explored in the last chapter, the com-
munity's risk posture--the impact of which is examined
later--and several other less quantifiable factors
influence this decision.
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The first of these factors is Somerville's and
Cambridge's time horizon. In this report it is postu-
lated that Proposition 2 has forced the cities to think
in the immediate term only. Nonetheless, governments
are charged with protecting the interests of future as
well as present citizens. The point here is not
to resolve this dilemma, but to explain the impact of this
factor on the choice of a resource recovery ownership struc-
ture for Cambridge and Somerville. The scenarios analyzed
in the preceeding section show that while the public scenarios
generated the greatest overall cost savings to the community,
they were more expensive than the private ownership options
in the early years of the plant's operation. Thus, if
Somerville and Cambridge have a long-term perspective,
public ownership appears to be the better overall investment.
The second issue is a variation on the time horizon
theme. It relates to the question of what happens in year 20
of plant operations when the waste processing contracts
expire. While the presumed useful life of the plant has
expired as well, the plant could very possibly last
longer. If the public owns the facility, they will cap-
ture the plant's full residual value. If instead it is
owned by a private firm, the community will lose its
claims on the facility after the contracts run out.
The third question around public versus private owner-
ship is the desire for control over the facility's operations.
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This is, in turn, dependent on the City's objectives. If
the Cities see this primarily as an economic development tool,
they would not -want to turn control over hiring decisions
and steam prices to a firm. Conversely, if the main goal was
the lowest possible tip fee in year 1 of operations, private
ownership is the answer. It should be noted that the amount
of real control the public sector has over the facility is a
function of the procurement strategy pursued, as discussed
in the next section.
Finally, the beliefs held by City residents and their
political leaders about the appropriate functions for the
private and public sectors can help resolve the ownership
question. This situation is probably different in Cambridge
than it is in Somerville, and the best judges of this are the
Cities' political leaders.
Thus, the public/private ownership decision is a
function of many things, and to be determined by the interests
of the project sponsors. For this reason, the'following
section does not assume any particular ownership situation
but instead lays out the options and concerns applicable
to each ownership condition.
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Financing Options
Somerville and Cambridge have several different
options to finance the resource recovery facility.
Much of this choice is dependent on whether the plant
is publically or privately owned. In either case, a
key concern will be how the risks of plant development
and operation will be divided among the project par-
ticipants. Some financing options actually require
certain specified risk allocation schemes, in fact.
If the cities select one of the public ownership
scenarios they have only one choice for financing the
project--general obligation bonds. General obligation
bonding is the traditional way municipal governments
finance public works projects. General obligation
bonds pledge the full faith and credit of the munici-
palities as the "recourse" for bondholders should pro-
ject profits not materialize. Due to the security
this recourse provides for bond buyers, as well as the
tax-exempt status these bonds enjoy, general obligation
bond financing represents the lowest possible cost of
capital, perhaps as much as rwo percentage points
below the next least expensive option. The actual
interest rate at which a general obligation bond can
be floated is dependent on the cities' bond ratings
and general capital market conditions.
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The importance of the interest rate in such capital-
intensive facilities as the resource recovery plants proposed
here cannot be overemphasized. By borrowing at a 12% rate
instead of the 14% assumed in the base case scenarios, the
four publicly-owned scenarios being considered all show
net disposal cost savings during the very first year of plant
operations! The first year tip fees can drop as much as
20% from this two percentage point interest rate reduction
in the cases of Scenarios 6A and 8A--to $10.24 and $13.12,
respectively, with each year thereafter showing even further
reductions (through year 15). Scenarios 1A and llA drop the
net tip fees to $14.08 and 15.82--still below the $16 mark.
The following chart illustrates the effect of the 2% interest
rate reduction:
net tip--year 1
int. rate Scenario 1A 6A 8A llA
@ 14% int. $ 16.81 12.76 16.34 19.12
@ 12% int. 14.08 10.24 13.12 15.82
Despite the considerable interest rate savings that
could result from choosing general obligation bonding as
the financing method, there are some problems associated
with it. First, it is not clear that this theoretical
interest rate reduction chould be fully realized by
Cambridge and Somerville. The cities and town of the
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts have recently received
poor bond ratings due to the passage of Proposition 2 ,
raising the cost of general obligation bond financing
and thus reducing the amount of interest savings over
other financing choices, that are achievable. In fact,
members of the financial community have indicated that
private concerns would probably be able to borrow at
nearly the same rate on a project revenue basis as cities
would on a general obligation bond basis now. 1 Thus,
there is less reason for Somerville and Cambridge to
put their tax levies at risk at this time of tight
municipal budgets which are unable to absorb an even
temporary setback.
Second, the ability of municipalities to use gen-
eral obligation bonds is limited--both due to legisla-
tively-mandated debt ceilings and considerations of
market saturation. Since both Somerville and Cambridge
have many other public facilities they would like to
see developed more urgently than a resource recovery
plant,2 the use of a general obligation bond for this
project would require it to be placed on the G.O. bond
"wish list". This might cause costly delays in project
implementation.
Revenue bond financing would represent the next
least expensive financing option, but forecloses the
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public ownership option. Cambridge and Somerville could
issue revenue bonds on a project basis on behalf of a
private concern for this particular project, if it is
deemed to have a public purpose by the issuer. These
would be tax-exempt also. Revenue bonds, however, are
non-recourse--that is, bondholders are entitled only
to project revenues and have no claim on the financial
base of the bond issuer. In other words, Somerville and
Cambridge as entities would not be liable to bondholders
for repayment delinquencies.
Revenue bonds, since they offer the income stream of
the project as collateral, cause potential bond purchasers to
carefully scrutinize project economics. In order to be sale-
able, revenue bonds must provide the bondholder with assurance
that other parties are assuming certain of tne risks. Revenue
bond financing, then, bounds the contractual agreements,
giving the municipalities less freedom in their negotiations
with the system vendor.
Revenue bonds do appeal to the private sector. It
is the least expensive way for firms to raise capital, since
these bonds are tax exempt,and the non-recourse aspect is
attractive as well. The firm could achieve considerable cost
savings over the purely private option (discussed next),
which hopefully would be plowed back into the community
through lower tip fees.
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The one problem with this financing method for these
firms is that revenue bonds may endanger their ability to
utilize the full range of tax benefits. This issue is
elaborated upon in the legal section of this report.
As of December 31, 1982, however, the Business Energy
Tax Credit will not be available if tax-exempt revenue
bonds are used to finance the project (see Chapter 7,
Section V). Equal to 5% of project cost, this loss
proves significant. In fact, it totally negates the
benefits of the 2% interest rate reduction, so that the
revenue bond option becomes more costly to the com-
munity if the spread between the tax-exempt and non-
tax-exempt issues is only two percentage points.
The following chart illustrates:
net tip fee
int. rate Scenario 2B 7B 8B 11B
16% (Base $ 13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
case ntf)
14% 14.13 14.05 15.28 16.41
The private sector can also finance the project
through borrowing froi, financial institutions. This
leads to the highest debt service costs. The impact of
the higher interest rate is mitigated to a degree,
though, by the ability of the private owner to deduct
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the interest portion of the debt service payment from
the firm's taxable income, as mentioned in the financial
analysis section, as well as enabling the firm to enjoy
the full range of federal subsidies. Traditional pri-
vate financing is also the simplest and thus quickest
way to finance the project. For these reasons, it may
be preferred by the firm that owns the facility. Since
this choice is a matter of negotiation between the firm
and the cities, and it is a function of the creditwor-
thiness of the chosen company which will determine the
interest rate for private borrowing, a judgment as to
the appropriate method for private ownership financing
will not be made.
A slight modification on the purely private fainan-
cing option may also be worth exploring. Known as
leasing, this method would allow responsibility for
plant ownership and plant operation to be separated.
The plant owner rents the facility to the municipali-
ties. Day to day control is vested in the lessee.
There are two types of lease arrangements: true lease
and safe harbour lease. The "true lease", or leveraged
lease, is somewhat strict in terms of the rules firms
must follow to qualify for the tax benefits of ownership.
The owner must borrow money from a financial intermedi-
ary--ruling out the revenue bond option. In addition,
the owner must earn a profit from the operation
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independent of the tax benefits associated with such
ownership, must lease the property for no longer than
80% of the equipment's useful life, and offer to sell
the equipment to the lessee at the end of the lease
term for no less than the fair market value of the prop-
erty. Given the restrictiveness of these arrangements,
the leveraged lease financing option should be considered
only if Cambridge and Somerville wish to control the
daily plant operations without losing the tax benefits
of private ownership.
The "safe harbour" lease is a Reagan Administration
innovation. The plant owner has no relation to the plant
operator and leases equipment to that operator on paper
only. This type of leasing has much more liberal
provisions--such as enabling profits to derive solely
from tax benefits and a "bargain" (i.e., $1) end-of-
lease purchase option is allowed--this type of lease is
actually a mechanism for selling tax losses rather
than a lease.
To qualify for safe harbour leasing, both the lessor and
the lessee must be non-tax-exempt entities. Thus, the parti-
cipation of a third party would be necessary in this case,
since the municipalities are tax-exempt. This means that an
additional actor will be sharing in project benefits, reduc-
ing t. se that can be captured by Somerville and Cambridge.
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Furthermore, the safe harbour concept is being challenged in
Congress and it is unclear if it will really be an option by
the time this plant would be going to the financial markets.
Thus, it is not an ideal method. Nonetheless, it might be
considered in this case if Cambridge Steam Company wanted to
operate the resource recovery plant. Because Cambridge Steam
Company is a utility, it does not qualify for the accelerated
depreciation schedule that is at the heart of the private
ownership profitability. Cambridge Steam Company might be
interested so that they could capture the maximum amount of
project benefits in the form of lower steam rates, and given
the City of Cambridge's interest in maintaining the viability
of the Cambridge Steam Loop, they might go along. If this
is the case, safe harbour leasing might be attractive, with
the Cambridge Steam Company the lessee and any corporation
large enough to want to purchase the tax benefits the lessor.
Under any ownership structure and financing plan ,
the clear specification of risk assumption will reduce the
cost of borrowing money to finance the project, since it
assures bondholders of limited liability. Although a degree
of risk absorption. is a negotiable item in each case, a
description of what are regarded as typical arrangements
follows.
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Risk Assumption
While waterwall incineration and modular air-combustion
are considered proven technologies from a technical stand-
point, if the cities should decide to undertake develop-
ment of a resource recovery facility, a key concern of the
financial community will be how the project risks will be
divided among private and public sector participants. "Risk"
here means a category of events whose reliability is uncertain
yet whose favorable outcome affects the plant's financial
success. The uncertainties involved in a possible Cambridge/
Somerville operation fall into six categories:
* uncertainties involved in facility construction--
delays and cost overruns;
* uncertainties about facility operation--its reli-
ability;
* uncertainties affecting waste supply--its adequacy
and composition;
* uncertainties relating to energy markets--the depen-
dability of purchases;
* uncertainties impacting alternative/ash disposal--the
availability of affordable sites; and
* uncertainties of "unforeseen circumstances" changing
the facility's financial attractiveness.
In developing the base case, no risks were assumed to
be taken by any party. In reality, bondholders demand that
other project participants accept some of the risks. By this,
it is meant that either the plant operator or the cities
will bear the increased operations costs should any value
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estimated in the base case prove too favorable. Conversely,
the party that accepts this risk also will enjoy the reward
if the base case estimates prove pessimistic.
Given the financial constraints of the Somerville and
Cambridge budgets, the Cities will want to shoulder as few
risks as possible. If the plant owner or operator accepts the
risks, however, they will do so at a cost to the municipality.
In other words, the firm will charge a risk premium to cover
any reasonable negative changes that might occur as well as
an additional amount to compensate them for living with the
particular uncertainty.
The perspective taken here is that of Cambridge and
Somerville. Each uncertainty is discussed and analyzed in
terms of its likely impact should the base case figures be
optimistic. In quantifying these impacts, the report demon-
strates the sensitivity of plant success to each of the key
variables, and should assist in the Cities' evaluation of
the degree and type of risk they wish to take. Of course,
any of these variables could turn out to be more helpful to
the plant economics than expected, causing the facility to
be even more of a good project than anticipated.
Risk Category #1--Facility Construction
As illustrated in the financial analysis, the capital
cost component of a resource recovery facility is one of the
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most significant elements in determining the plant's financial
feasibility. If contruction delays, initial cost underesti-
mations, or other factors cause the capital costs to rise,
some party must pay for the additional amount required.
If the plant is privately owned, in most cases the owner
absorbs this loss. Under public ownership, however, who pays
is a function of the municipalities' procurement approach.
The traditional procurement method is called architect
and engineer, or "A & E" for short. The municipality issues
a "Request for Proposal" (RFP) and firms bid for the contract
to design and build the plant to the specifications delineated
by the municipality. Usually these contracts enable the firm
to pass through to the municipalities construction cost
increases to some degree.
The Cities can use a different procurement method if
they are concerned with capital cost overruns, called a
turnkey approach. The Cities contract with a firm to design
and build the plant for an agreed-upon sum. The contractor
thus assumes the risk of capital cost underestimation and
costly delays, while Cambridge and Somerville retain control
over operations of the plant.
The value of this certainty in capital cost is signif-
icant. It means that if construction delays, initial under-
estimation, or other factors cause the capital costs of the
facility to rise, the private party will take the loss.
The community would be ill-advised to take this risk. An
167
underestimation of plant capital costs of 20% is enough to
make all of the first y.ar tip fees in the public ownership
scenarios rise above $16. The tip fee would rise in Scenario
1A to $20.79, to $16.75 in Scenario 6A, and to $19.00 and
$23.58 in Scenarios 8A and llA, as illustrated below:
net tip
cap. cost Scenario 1A 6A 8A 1lA
expected $ 16.81 12.76 16.34 19.12
up 20% 20.79 16.75 19.00 23.58
Thus, Somerville and Cambridge would benefit from assurances
about capital expenditures from the builders.
Risk Category #2--Plant Operations
If the facility is privately owned, it is the respon-
sibility of that owner to see to it that the plant meets its
obligations to process municipal solid waste and to produce
energy. If the public owner desires to shift responsibility
to a private party, the municipalities must contract with a
plant operator for this purpose. Otherwise, the City is
liable for any costs associated with operational failures.
The acceptance of operating responsibility is impor-
tant, since plant breakdowns for even short periods of time
can cause significant rises in plant operating costs. If
a resource recovery plant is shut down, the plant
operator must not only pay for repairs, but also pay to dis-
pose of the solid waste in alternative locations and loses
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revenue from steam and electric sales that cannot occur.
An unscheduled downtime of merely two weeks, for instance,
will cause the annual tip fee to rise 12-15%. For the first
year of operations, this could mean tip fees of $18.68 for
Scenario 1A, $14.63 for 6A, 18.41 for 8A, and $21.35 for
llA, as illustrated below:
net tip
operation Scenario lA 6A 8A llA
base $16.81 12.76 16.34 19.12
down 2 wks. 18.68 14.63 18.41 21.35
These downtime tip fees would be even higher if the contracts
for steam sales required the plant to use auxilliary fuel
to provide the energy they usually buy from the plant.
A third procurement option would allow Somerville and
Cambridge to shift operating as well as construction risks
to a private actor while still retaining plant ownership.
This is called the "full service vendor" method. Under
such an arrangement, the resource recovery plant vendor
provides the plant design, supplies the equipment, executes
facility construction, and operates the plant for at least
as long as the term of the bond issue. The vendor assumes
the following responsibilities: (1) In the construction phase,
the vendor guarantees that the facility will be completed
on schedule at the agreed-upon price, that it can process
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the tonnage capacity and produce the energy quantity for
which it was designed, and that it meets environmental
quality standards; and (2) During the operations phase,
the vendor will make any adjustments so that the plant meets
its needed capacity and continues to meet environmental
standards, as well as taking care of maintenance and per-
sonnel supervision. 3 Also, since the vendor offering
the operations contract will be the same one who builds
the plant, the use of a full service vendor approach would
have the additional advantage of providing an incentive for
the builder not to cut initial costs at the expense of
more operational expenses later.
The full service procurement strategy should be
considered seriously if Somerville and Cambridge decide
to own the plant. While the other two methods increase
the amount of operational control that the cities would
have, Cambridge and Somerville do not currently employ
people with sufficient technical training to oversee the
designing and building and operating of a resource
recovery project. It requires specialized training.
It would be difficult and time-consuming for the cities
to recruit such personnel, and in fact current muni-
cipal salary levels in Somerville and Cambridge are probably
too low to attract the needed individuals from the resource
recovery industry from where they would have to be drawn.
Thus, the Cities would not be effective plant managers and
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this situation could result in costly plant breakdowns
and inefficiencies, amounting to more than two weeks of
downtime per year.
This service will not be free to the cities, of
course. Although the vendor fee is probably a negoti-
able item, Cambridge and Somerville can expect to pay
approximately $3.00/ton, based on the operator's fees
the firms expense under private ownership conditions
-(see Base Case Assumptions). Thus, if Somerville and
Cambridge feel they can operate the plant efficiently
and keep unscheduled downtime to no more than two
weeks per year, the full service vendor would be more
expensive. However, any other operating or construc-
tion problem that occurred in addition to this two weeks
downtime would cause the full service vendor approach
to be the best deal.
Moreover, the additional $3/ton fee would still
result in positive overall cash flows for the public
scenarios, even though it would take a few more years
for the tip fees to fall below $16. In Scenario 6A,
the first year of operation would still show a tip
fee under $16, and in Scenario 8A this would happen
in year three. In fact, in all the public sector
ownership cases, the net tip fee would drop below
$16 within the first five years of plant operation,
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even with the additional $3/ton fee. The new tip
fees (per ton) are shown:
Year
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5
1A $19.81 18.33 16.94 15.63 11.39
6A 15.76 14.40 13.11 11.90 10.76
8A 19.34 17.27 15.32 13.48 11.74
llA 22.12 20.34 18.66 17.07 15.58
The first two risk categories, relating to the
construction and operation of the facility, require
explicit assignment only if the owner is the public.
If private ownership occurs, these risks automatically
fall to that owner. The remaining risk categories,
on the other hand, affect any plant owner and thus
must always be allocated contractually.
Risk Category #3--Waste Supply
In a resource recovery plant, the waste is the central
element in the generation of revenue, and its absence causes
everything else to fail. Without adequate tonnage tip
revenues are too low and enough steam cannot be generated and
therefore cannot be sold. Since these are the key revenue
items, a reduction in the quantity of waste delivered under
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the amount expected has severe consequences. These are most
severe in the case of public ownership, since Plant owners
have no ability to write off lost revenues in tax cushions.
For instance, for all of the four public scenarios under con-
sideration, a 10% reduction in total annual delivered ton-
nage would raise first year tip fees above the $16 level--in
Scenario 6A one would see a 26% hike to $16.10. The other
three public scenarios would experience net tip fees of over
$20 in year one, going as high as $23.30 in Scenario llA,
as seen in the following chart:
net tip fee
tonnage Scenario 1A 6A 8A llA
base $ 16.81 12.76 16.34 19.12
10% less tons 20.37 16.10 20.42 23.30
The implication of this finding is that Somerville and
Cambridge must work out agreements with each other about the
delivery of solid waste to the plant. However, given their
historic and current control of the waste stream, the Cities
should be able to commit to each other with some certainty
the delivery of the anticipated solid waste. They could also
attract private refuse disposers for short periods if there
was a shortfall on municipally collected trash.
In the private ownership case, the effects of the
lost revenue are cushione'd by the nation's tax structure.
Thus, a 10% tonnage reduction would cause net tip fees to
rise only to $14.06 for Scenario 2B; $14.13 for Scenario 7B;
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$15.10 for Scenario 8B; and $16.28 for Scenario llB. None-
theless, since private plant operators have no control over
the collection of the waste, they feel reluctant to accept
the risk of tonnage reductions, and want to be able to raise
tip fees by the amount of loss. The chart below illustrates
the increase that might be demanded:
net tip fee
tonnage Scenario 2B 7B 8B llB
base $13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
10% less tons 14.06 14.13 15.10 16.28
Since this is such a key issue, two mechanisms have been
developed to shift the risk in this category from the private
operator or the entire customer base. These are: (1) the
plant operator negotiates "put or pay" contracts with solid
waste collectors (in this case Cambridge and Somerville), who
guarantee a certain tonnage. If they fail to deliver, they
are liable for payment for disposing of the contracted tonnage
plus the lost revenue from not producing the energy for sale
that would have been recovered from promised, but undelivered,
tonnage. Usually the waste collector is given a lower tipping
fee in exchange for these guarantees; and (2)the municipality
will legislate that all waste collected within their juris-
diction must be dumped at the resource recovery plant.
The constitutionality of these measures is discussed in the
next section. Furthermore, if the facility is to be owned by
a private firm, they will often require the municipality or
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other waste supplier to guarantee the heat content and
acceptable quality of the trash.
Risk Category #4--Energy Markets
The fourth area requiring risk assignment is the
purchase commitment of the project's energy output.
Some project participant must absorb the risk of rate
changes and fluctuations in demand by the energy user.
Again, the impact of this uncertainty is more severe
in the public ownership cases due to the public sector's
inability to absorb the losses where the tax laws
provide a write-off for the private sector. A 10%
reduction in steam revenues resulting from either
reduced quantity sold or rate reductions would make
first year tip fees quite high--ranging from Scenario
6A's $15.77 to Scenario llA's $22.24, in the public
sector cases. These changes in net tip fees are
illustrated below:
net tip fees
steam revenue1A 6A 8A A
base 16.81 12.76 16.34 14.19
10% reduction 19.61 15.77 19.35 22.24
On the other hand, the steam price used in the
base case is quite low. To compensate for other energy
revenue losses, the cities could raise steam prices
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by $1/thousand pounds and save $4/ton on their net
disposal costs.
For the cases of private owners, the bondholders
or creditors need not worry as much--a 10% reduction in
steam revenues would only raise costs the equivalent
of under $1/ton. The following chart demonstrates:
net tip fee
steam revenu Scenario 2B 7B 8B llB
base $13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
10% less revenue 13.82 13.88 15.11 16.16
To shift this risk from the municipalities or trash sup-
pliers, "take or pay" contracts have been developed to bind
the energy purchaser. These demand agreements are parallel
to the "put or pay" supply contracts, and simply require that
the energy purchaser buy the agreed-upon amount of power or
pay for it anyway.
Risk Category #5--Ash/Alternative Disposal
The risk of disruption in the ash disposal arrangements
and availability of alternative disposal mechanisms for plant
downtime must be accounted for. These risks are not severe in
terms of consequences for Cambridge and Somerville, and the
Cities could therefore afford to absorb them. Neither City
is in a waste disposal crisis situation, and there appear to
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be many opportunities for affordable waste/ash disposal
should that be necessary. In addition, disposal costs repre-
sent a small part of total annual project expenses, so quite
a bit of increase in cost could be tolerated.
Risk Category #6--Unforeseen Circumstances
Finally, unforeseen changes in circumstances might also
influence project economics, and must be assigned as risks.
Usually municipalities agree to take at least a good portion
of the risks of changes in the law relating to resource
recovery plants, such as new environmental regulations and
for "acts of God". These uncertainties are hard to quantify
both in terms of their likelihood and their impact on project
economics since they are so indefinite.
Inflation is one of these uncertainties that is more
easily understood. In the financial analysis section, a 6%
inflation rate was used and it was assumed that all project
costs and revenue items would inflate at this rate, save the
debt service payment which remains fixed. If separate items
rise at different rates of inflation, project economics could
be negatively affected. To understand the impact of inflation
rate variations, a 4% and an 8% inflation rate was tried.
The project elements all rose at the 4 or 8% except the debt
service payment. If inflation goes to 8%, all the scenarios
look better than in the 6% base case, so this result needs
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no further exploration here. If inflation rises evenly
beyond the 6% level, in fact, the project will always
look better.
The effect of the 4% rate, however, is startling. If
inflation is merely 2% less than expected, net tip fees
jump. Thus, the project risk is really a deflation risk
rather than an inflation one.
Contrary to some of the other variables, though,
this change would cause project costs to rise much more
if the plant were built under private sector ownership.
The 2% drop would cause net tip fees to shoot up--
nearly 10% for Scenario 2B and 7B. Moreover, inflation
is probably the least predictable of the project items,
and thus the estimates the least reliable. Therefore,
if private ownership is selected by Cambridge and Somer-
ville, they should be careful about accepting the risks
of changes in the inflation rate. The effects of
inflation rate changes on privately owned firms are
displayed below:
net tip fee
inflationrat 2B- 7B 8B 11B
6% base $13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
4% 14.36 14.40 15.31 16.20
8% 11.75 11.76 13.66 14.84
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If Somerville and Cambridge own the plant, however, they
are likely to have little choice but to absorb this risk.
Fortunately, the consequences of the rate changes are not as
severe as under private ownership. The four percent inflation
rate tested showed tipping fees approximately $1 greater than
their base case net tip fees. The problem is exacerbated, how
ever, by the fact that this change has a compounding effect.
In other words, the tip fees get larger than their base case
ones in succeeding project years so that tip fees do not fall
as quickly. However, by Year 3 of plant operations, in all
public ownership scenarios save llA, the tip fee. drops below
$16 even with this 4% rate. The likelihood of inflation
falling below an average of 4% over the project life seems
small. Thus, the inflation risk for public ownership seems
tolerable. The impact of the inflation uncertainty over
time is illustrated in the chart that follows:
net tip fees
year 1A 6A 8A llA
6% 4% 6% 4% 6% 4% 6% 4%
1 16.81 17.82 12.76 13.70 16.34 17.53 19.12 20.34
2 15.33 16.78 11.40 12.73 14.27 16.07 17.34 19.08
3 13.94 15.78 10.11 11.81 12.32 14.67 15.66 17.87
4 12.63 14.82 8.90 10.92 10.48 13.32 14.07 16.71
5 11.39 13.89 7.76 10.07 8.74 12.02 12.58 15.59
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The final risk issue in this category is only appli-
cable in the cases of private ownership, and involves the
role of tax benefits. Since the profits in resource
recovery come primarily from the federal tax subsidies,
unfavorable changes in the tax code threaten the project's
economic viability. And while the private owner is wil-
ling to take "the technical risk of being able to use the
expected tax savings" (e.g., sufficient profits from other
operations), the firms have indicated an unwillingness
to accept the risk of reduced tax earnings through changes
in federal tax laws.5 Often, in negotiating for a portion
of the tax subsidies, communities are asked to guarantee
a certain level of tax benefits. Given the central role
these federal subsidies play in project economics, Somer-
ville and Cambridge should be quite reluctant to shoulder
much of this risk. -
Negotiations
There are then clearly many risk assignment issues
about which Cambridge and Somerville will have to nego-
tiate with private project participants. There are
other items for negotiation if Somerville and Cambridge
choose to follow the private ownership course. In
settling the contract for the private operation of the
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resource recovery plant, Cambridge and Somerville can
try to influence the percentage of capital costs
covered by equity and the return demanded on that eauity con-
tribution, perhaps by accepting some of the risks analyzed
here. To develop a negotiating position, Somerville and Cam-
bridge need to have an idea of the value of changes in these
items so that the Cities can weigh the costs (in terms of
additional risk absorbed) of the changes, against their
benefits.
An increase in the equity contribution made by the firm
reduces the size of the project debt. Since debt is such a
large item in project costs, a change in equity would be
expected to have a major impact on the project. On the
other hand, increasing the equity contribution while
keeping constant the rate of return on equity required
means that a greater share of the project's Net Present
Value will be siphoned off for profits. Surprisingly,
this latter fact proves more significant--an increase
in the equity portion of the financial package to 30%
actually increases the net tip fees by about $0.30/ton,
as seen below:
net tip fee
% equity , Scenario 2B 7B 8B 11B
base 25% $13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
30% contrib. 13.48 13.48 14.78 15.79
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Cambridge and Somerville, then, would not want to see
the percentage of capital that was raised through equity
contributions increased. This makes the negotiation
process smoother as the request for additional equity
is likely to have met with resistance.
Flexibility in determining the other negotiable
item is likely to be even more difficult to accomplish
than the increase in the equity contribution would have
been, should this have proven desirable. Fortunately,
the payoffs are low enough not to make it terribly
tempting for Somerville and Cambridge. The item of
reference here is the Return on Equity demanded by the
firm. While firms claim they need the 30% return
assumed in this analysis, 6 if Cambridge and Somerville
could persuade the firm to accept a 20% return instead
based on the fact that this represents a healthy profit
when money is being lent at 16% interest, they could
only save about $0.20/ton, making it hardly worth the
effort. Conversely if a 40% return on equity was
demanded in exchange for concessions, the cities could
affort to offer this magnanimously, since it would
carry a price tag of only $0.20-0.30/ton! The impacts
are illustrated below:
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et tip fee
Return on Eauity 2B 7B 8B 11B
base 30% ROE $13.15 13.17 14.51 15.54
20 % ROE 12.90 12.93 14.32 15.34
40 % ROE 13.40 13.41 14.70 15.74
Thus, once Cambridge and Somerville determine that the
resource recovery plant's technical and financial feasibility
merits further action, a host of decisions are thrown upon
them before the project can approach the implementation stage.
The Cities must select an ownership structure, develop an
understanding of the uncertainties involved, and determine
their willingness to absorb risks. From there a nego-
tiating strategy can be devised, if necessary. A summary
chart on the followina page presents an overview of the
effects of the uncertainties. The next step is to review the
legal constraints and the possible community impacts of the
project.
SUMMARY CHART--THE IMPACTS OF VARIABLE
NET TIP FEES
SHIFTS ON YEAR ONE
NET TIP FEES
(Ye
SCENARIOS
ar 1)
1A 2B
UNCERTAINTIES
BASE
GO Bonding, Public own-
ership, 12% interest.
IRB, Private ownership.*
co Construction cost over-
run of 20% (public own.)
Two weeks down time,
(public ownership)
10% fewer tons MSW
10% less steam sales
Inflation @ 4%
30% Equity investment
20% Return on Equity
16.81 13.15 12.76 13.17 16.34 14.51 19.12 15.54
14.08 10.24
14.13
20.79
18.68
13.12
14.05
16.75
14.63
15.82
15.28
19.00
18.41
16.41
23.38
21.35
20.37 14.06 16.10 14.13 20.42 15.10 23.30 16.28
19.61 13.82 15.77 13.88 19.35 15.11 22.24 16.16
17.82 14.36 13.70 14.40 17.53 15.31 20.34 16.20
13.48
12.90
13.48
12.93
14.78
14.32
15.79
15.34
*Business energy tax credit not included.
6A 7B 8A 8B7B A 8 1 A 11BllA
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABLE CHANGES
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO lA
3 4
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
16.81 15.33 13.94 12.63 11.39
17.82 16.78 13.78 14.82
13.85 13.99 12.27 10.68
14.08 12.75 11.51 10.33
13.89
9.20
9.23
22.44 20.29 18.90 17.39 16.35
19.61 18.13 16.74 15.43 14.19
20.37 18.73 17.19 15.73 14.35
18.80 17.20 13.72 14.30 12.97
SCENARIO 1B
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. req.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
(no BETC available)
NET TIP FEE
14.22
15.08
13.20
14.43
14.37
14.53
14.77
14.82
14.05
14.51
NET PRESENT VALUE
5.9
4.6
7.4
6.2
5.9
5.0
4.3
5.9
5 .4
5
YEAR
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABLE CHANGES
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO 2A
3 4
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
SCENARIO 2B
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. req.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
(no BETC available)
NET TIP FEE
13.15
14.36
11.75
13. 48
13.3 9
13. 64
13.82
14.06
12.90
14.13
NET PRESENT VALUE
9.1 million
7.3 mil.
11.2 mil.
9.6 mil.
9.1 mil.
9.2 mil.
8.1
7. 41 mil.
9.0 mil.
7.6 mil.
5
20.01
21.91
18.11
15.83
21.88
23.03
25.59
22.95
18.04
20.41
15.67
14.09
17.84
21.06
23.40
20.81
16.18
18.95
13.41
12.45
15.98
19.20
21.33
18.79
14.42
17.52
11.32
10.91
14.22
17.45
19.30
16.89
12.77
16.16
9.38
9.45
12.57
15.79
17.54
15.10
V'P AP 1
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABTLE CHANGES
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO 6A
3 4
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
SCENARIO 6B
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. req.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
(no BETC available)
NET TIP FEE
14.51
15.12
13.84
14.70
14.66
14.82
15.10
15.14
14.36
15.05
NET PRESENT VALUE
5.2
4.3
6.2
5.5
5.2
5.2
4.3
4.1
5.2
4.4
5
12.76
13.70
11.88
10.24
14.63
15.77
16.10
14.75
11.40
12.73
10.16
9,02
13.27
14.40
15.33
13.39
10.11
11.81
8.57
7.87
11.98
13.12
13.90
12.10
8.90
10.92
7.10
6.78
10.77
11.91
12.55
10.89
7.76
10.07
5.74
5.76
9.63
10.76
11.28
9.75
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABLE CHANGES
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO 7A
3 4
FACTOR
- Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
SCENARIO 7B
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. req.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
(no BETC available)
NET TIP FEE
13.17
14.40
11.76
13.48
13.41
33.65
13.88
34.13
NET PRESENT VALUE
8.8
7.0
10.9
9.3
8.9
9.0
7.7
7.1
8.8
7.5
12.93
14.05
5
16.56
18.51
14.76
12.59
18.51
19.75
21.95
19.50
14.69
17.16
12.44
10.95
16.63
17.88
19.87
17.46
12.92
15.87
10.30
9.39
14.87
16.12
17.91
15.53
11.26
14.62
8.31
7.93
13.20
14.45
16.06
13.73
9.69
13.42
6.47
6.54
11.63
12.88
14.31
12.02
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABLE CHANG7S
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO 8A
3 4
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
16.34
17.53
15.21
13.12
18.41
19.35
20.42
17.67
SCENARIO 8B
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. req.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
(no BETC available)
NET TIP FEE
14. 53
15.31
13.66
14.78
14.66
14.80
15.11
15.10
14.32
15.28
NET PRESENT VALUE
6.0
4.8
7.3
6.3
6.0
6.0
5.1
5.0
6.0
4.8
5
14.27
16.07
12.61
11.27
16.34
17.28
18.12
15.52
12.32
14.67
10.19
9.52
14.39
15.33
15.95
13.43
10.48
13.32
7.95
7.87
12.55
13.48
13.91
11.48
8.74
12.02
5.88
6.32
10.81
11.75
11.97
9.70
YEAR
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NET TIP FEES AFTER VARIABLE CHANGES
YEAR 1 2
SCENARIO llA
43
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
Interest rate
@ 12%
Two week downtime
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Capital cost overrun
of 10%
SCENARIO llB
FACTOR
Base
Inflation
@ 4%
@ 8%
30% Equity Invest.
Capital cost over.
10%
20%
10% less steam sales
10% fewer tons MSW
Return on Eq. reg.
20%
Interest rate
@ 14%
NET TIP FEE
15.54
16.20
14.84
15.79
15.71
15.88
16.16
16.28
15.34-
16.41
NET PRESENT VALUE
2.0
1.6
2.5
2.2
2.0
2.0
1.6
1.5
2.0
1.4
5
19.12
20.-4
17.96
15.82
21.35
22.24
23.30
21.35
17.34
19.08
15.72
14.22
19.57
29.46
21.32
19.49
15.66
17.87
13.64
12.72
17.89
18.78
19.45
17.70
14.07
16.71
11.72
11.30
16.30
17.20
17.69
16.09
12.58
15.59
9.93
9.96
14.81
15.70
16.03
14.56
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NOTES
1. Speech by William Mills, Standard and Poors, Resource
Resource Recovery Financing Conference, sponsored by the
United States Conference of Mayors and United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, March 29, 1982.
2. Conversations with Richard Fahlander, Cambridge Community
Development Department, and Rick Mitchell, Somerville Office
of Planning and Community Development.
3. Nicoll, David, J. H., President, Widmer and Ernst, Inc.,
"Guarantees Offered by a Full-Service Systems Vendor,"
Proceedings: Resource Recovery Financing Conference, sponsored
by the United States Conference of Mayors and United States
Environmental Protection Agency, March 29, 1982.
4. Speech by George Dinolfo, Vice President, Municipal
Financing, Salomon Brothers, at Resource Recovery Financing
Conference, sponsored by the United States Conference of
Mayors and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, March 29, 1982.
5. Ward, Lewis Ott, UOP Inc., "Systems' Contractor
Perspective of Resource Recovery Facility Financing,"
Proceedings: Resource Recovery Financing Conference, sponsored
by the United States Conference of Mayors and United States
Environmental Protection Agency, March 29, 1982, p. 16.
6. ibid, p.14
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SECTION IV--IMPACTS
195
IMPACT ANALYSIS
This chapter discusses the impacts of building the
waste-to-energy plant, particularly with respect to Somer-
ville's and Cambridge's municipal government, residents
and businesses. The impact analysis begins by describing
the sites and the general circumstances that could
influence its development. An environmental and economic
evaluation of the impacts of the resource recovery plant
follows.
As discussed in the introduction, the sites proposed
for the resource recovery plant are the current Somerville
and Cambridge solid waste transfer stations. The location
of the Somerville refuse transfer station, atthe oldmunici-
pal incinerator site, is about one-eighth of a mile from the
Cambridge border in East Somerville. It sits at the inter-
section of Medford Street, McGrath and O'Brien Highway,
Poplar Street and Somerville Avenue. It is owned by the
City of Somerville, which receives an annual lease pay-
ment of $32,000 from the contractor who operates the trans-
fer station. The trash transfer point for Cambridge is
at East Street in East Cambridge, about one mile from
the Somerville site, down the McGrath and O'Brien Highway.
This part of East Somerville is a mixed use area.
Stop-&-Shop/Bradlees shopping center is directly opposite
the incinerator on the other side of the Mcgrath and O'Brien
Highway. The portion along the Cambridge border has a small
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segment of residential development interspersed and surround-
ed by some food processing plants and in-fill industries
such as roofers, metal workers, and auto parts dealers.
The area on the Cambridge side of the border is mostly
residential served by the Cambridge Street commercial est-
ablishments. The area immediately bordering the inciner-
ator is mostly vacant land surrounded by warehouses and
railroad tracks. Some new warehouse facilities are ex-
pected to locate here. This area has some large vacant
lots and buildings, and excellent access to transporta-
tion. Nonetheless, the area would be best described as
underutilized.
The Cambridge solid waste transfer site sits at the
edge of what remains of East Cambridge's industrial area.
While some manufacturing continues, over the years, several
large producers such as Carter Ink, Boston Woven Hose and
the American Twine Co. have closed their East Cambridge
operations. Today some high tech and commercial uses also
share this area, which is now the East Cambridge Revitaliza-
tion District (ECRD). The ECRD was designed to take advan-
tage of the area's vacant lots and buildings, location and
transportation access. The revitalization district is
undergoing nearly $400 million of new development and re-
hab to house mostly new office, research and commercial
activities. The area has been served by the Cambridge
Steam Loop for nearly 80 years. Unlike the Somerville site,
the Cambridqe site may be under some development pressures.
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The impacts upon air quality, noise, traffic, visual
appearance, water usage and sewerage are the potential neg-
ative environmental considerations. However, the track
record over the last several years for operating resource
recovery facilities, shows no environmental impact problems.
As discussed in the technology section, particulate
emmissions, the only major potential air pollutant in
resource recovery plants, are found to be below federal
standards for both waterwall and modular air controlled
systems. Although usually unnecessary, additional air
pollution control equipment can be added to meet specific
state and local requirements.
Major noise level impacts come only during construc-
tion. These will happen for a shorter period of time and
at a lower intensity for modular than for waterwall systems,
as the waterwall plant is built on-site where the modular
unit is prepackaged. However, in neither the case of the
Somerville nor the Cambridge site are there neighbors
which are particularly sensitive to construction noises.
Each proposed site is already used for solid waste
handling. Thus, the impacts on traffic and visual quali-
ties are expected to be neglible. The only additional
traffic to either site would come from the other city's
trash travelling the extra one mile on the highway.
Visual qualities may in fact improve with the building
of the resource recovery facility. Modern facilities
have been clean neighbors, and the transfer site not
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built upon may then be available for other uses.
The important fact to note in terms of water usage
and sewerage is whose responsibility it is. If the
facility is built in Somerville, then the Metropolitan
District Commission (MDC) handles water supply and
sewerage. The MDC fully services Somerville in these ways and
would like to be informed of potential water and sewerage
uses and needs. If the facility is built in Cambridge,
then the Cambridge Water Department will deliver water
and the Cambridge Department of Public Works will handle
sewerage. Other resource recovery plants of similiar
size that also use a closed steam-condensate loop return
system for energy distribution have experienced minimal
water and sewerage impacts.
The major impact left to be analysed is the economic
affect of building the waste-to-energy plant on jobs and
on each city's municipal budgets. The jobs impact should
be evaluated in terms of building and operating the plant
itself, and the secondary effects of using the energy
generated as an economic development tool.
Somerville and Cambridqe have increasinq unemployment.
According to the Massachusetts Division of Employment
and Security, unemployment in Cambridge increased from
6.1% in February 1981 to 8.0% in February 1982; the Somer-
ville unemployment rate jumped from 6.7% to 8.7% over this
same period. This situation means that each city is looking
to increase job opportunities.
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In building the resource recovery plant, the most im-
portant decision that affects employment is whether to build
a modular or a waterwall facility. Camp, Dresser and McKee
estimate that about 15 people are needed to build the founda-
tion and structure to house the pre-fabricated modular unit,
whereas approximately 200 construction trade people are
needed to build a waterwall system.1 The plant construction
time is six months to one year for a modular and at least
two years for a waterwall system. Boilermakers, pipfitters,
masons, iron workers, electricians, carpenters, equipment
operators and laborers are among those needed to build the
plant. Since most of these are union positions, Cambridge
and Somerville would do themselves well to work with
building trade unions that can and do emDloy local residents.
To operate either a modular or a waterwall plant of
2
this size requires about 20 people. If the facility was a
publically-owned venture of Somerville, then all of these
employees must be Somerville residents. Cambridge does
not have a similiar requirement so that it is unclear what
the hiring policy would be for a joint Cambridge/Somerville
public venture.
There are also significant employment impacts that
could result from the energy produced by the resource
recovery plant. The proposed Somerville loop could attract
two to three new light manufacturing plants that are steam
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dependent firms resulting in several hundred jobs both in
construction and operation. Also several of the existing
businesses that would be served by the Somerville loop could
then be prompted toward completing their expansion plans,
thereby creating additional job opportunities. Thus, the
development of the Somerville Steam Loop must coincide with
economic development activities.
It is less clear what the employment impacts are that
result from a resource recovery plant that delivers steam
to the Cambridge Steam Loop. Already nearly $400 million
of new development is scheduled for the area served by the
Cambridge Steam Loop, yet at this point the Cambridge Steam
Loop has no new customers. As the Cambridge Steam Loop
has been operating for 80 years, the price of the steam,
not reliability, is the key concern. A lower rate for
steam brought about by the development of the resource
recovery plant, may encourage further development and/
or provide greater future stability for new and existing
businesses through affordable and dependable energy
prices. Also, the steam produced by the resource recovery
plant, especially if available at lower prices than the
Cambridge Steam Co. can generate it now, could help ensure
the present steam loop's viability. As mentioned earlier,
there has been some talk.of closing this operation. By
helping to maintain the current steam loop in operation,
the jobs dependent upon the loop are saved.
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Finally, given Prop 2 one of the most significant im-
pacts to evaluate is the effect on Somerville' s and Cambridqe' s
municipal budgets. In order to understand these impacts,
it is neccessary to understand how Prop 2 turned around
the basic municipal tax agreement.
Traditionally, the tax rate is a function of the amount
of money to be raised, the tax levy, divided by the assessed
valuation, the values the taxes are to be apportioned by.
Today, however, under Prop 2 , the maximum tax rate is $25.00
per $1000.00 assessed valuation, and the tax levy is fixed
at not more that 102.5% of the previous year's level. If
a municipality's fully assessed tax rate is over $25/1000
then it must cut back on total municipal expenditures by
15% a year until it reaches the Prop 2 maximum tax rate.
These requirements mean that communities have almost no
flexibility in determining the size of the municipal
budget, since they have no authority to impose taxes other
than property taxes. -The only recourse is a local override
in the form of a referendum that must occur each year.
Cambridge's 1982 tax rate of $37/1000 and Somerville's
rate of $46/1000 are both well above the $25/1000 Prop 2
maximum. While Cambridge has overridden the Prop 2 legis-
lation this year and therefore has some flexibility, Somer-
ville has to cut back on its municipal expenditures by 15%
a year until it reaches the $25/1000 tax rate. An override
has not occurred. Any new services it wishes to offer
must be funded by cuts in other basic services.
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This situation affects the way new development is to
be evaluated. In the past, a development was either a net
gain, paying more in taxes than demanding in services, or
a net drain, demanding more in services than paying in taxes
on the municipoality. However, under Prop 2 , the property
tax revenues from new development may be one of only ways
Cambridge and Somerville can actually increase their property
tax levies that are otherwise limited. For Somerville and
Cambridge property tax values will increase at a higher than
2.5% rate allowed by Prop 2 , thus causing the tax rate in
real terms to decrease even below the $25/1000 maximum. Al-
though the $25/1000 tax rate limit holds, the tax levy is al-
lowed to increase byan additional2.5% of the fullvalue of the
new development above the annual 2.5% increase. Both the
2.5% general increase allowed by Prop 2 and the increase
due to new development are reflected in the tax rate. If
new development requires fewer city services than it pays
in taxes, then the community gains. Thus under Prop 2 ,
development with low municipal service demands are preferred.
The resource recovery plant could offer Cambridge and
Somerville an opportunity to lower their costs of solid
waste disposal. Because these potential avoided costs of
solid waste disposal represent new real income, resource
recovery could in fact increase Somerville's and Cambridge's
ability to deliver other basic services. However, it is
very important to include all costs to the municipalities
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when evaluating proposed tip fees and the potential cost
savings of the resource recovery plant.
The costs andcircumstances forSomerville's andCambridge's
municipal budgetsdiffer. The effectsupon eachcomunitv's fis-
cal situation are evaluated first asa Somervilleonly, then
as a joint project. When calculating taxes for Somerville,
Prop 2 is assumed to be in effect, and in Cambridge the
taxes are figured assuming the local override.
Somerville pays $15.70/ton to dispose of its refuse.
It collects a $32,000 annual lease payment for the use fo
the transfer facility by Boston Power Associates (BPA) and
$.50/ton in host fees. At this time, the amount of the
host fees is unavailable. Based upon a structure that is
22,500 square feet built at $75.00 per square foot, the
resource recovery plant would generate about $42,000 in
property taxes if privately owned, assuming the maximum
$25/1000 tax rate allowed by Prop 2 . The property taxes
are about $31,000 and $13,000 respectively for the Somer-
ville steam pipe and the Somerville portion of the pipe
that would serve the Cambridge Steam Loop. Herr and
Associates estimates that the cost of city services for
road maintenance, and police and fire protection, etc to
be about $.60 per square foot for a building of this type
3
and size, resulting in a $13,500 annual tab.
In Cambridge, the tip fee is $18.65/ton. The recent
override of Prop 2 means that a privately owned waste-to-
energy plant would generate about $62,000 in property taxes
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figured at $37/1000, as compared to $42,000 under Prop 2 ,
and property taxes for the 750 foot steam pipe to the Cam-
bridge Steam Loop from the Cambridge are $14,000. If the
resource recovery plant is built in Somerville, the property
taxes on the Cambridge portion of the steam pipe to feed
the Cambridge Steam Loop are $55,000 for the 3000 foot pipe.
Somerville and Cambridge own the land where their
respective solid waste transfer stations are located. Thus
they have a choice about whether to receive the property
tax revenues as property tax or as a special lease payment
similiar to the present Somerville situation. With Prop
2 in place limiting the ability of Somerville and Cambridge
to raise the tax levy, each city would prefer the lease
payment arrangement.
If the plant is built in Somerville to handle only
Somerville's trash, then a $73,000 lease payment is made
equal to the property tax sum due. The lost $32,000
Boston Power Associates (BPA) payment and the $13,500 cost
of city services is debited from the amount to calculate
the net revenue gain of $27,500. Once determined, host fees
would also be deducted as lost income, if these private
dumpers were not able to use the resource recovery plant.
The revenue gain, then, acts as a cushion for the City to
cover unexpected costs or cost increases due to housing in
Somerville.
Another way to look at the revenue gain is how it
reflects on the real cost of disposal. The $27,500 divided
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by Somerville's 35,000 tons of trasl collected annually
translates to a tip fee decrease of $.79/ton beneath the
net tip fee of Scenario 11. This fee is compared to the
present net tipping rate of $15.17/ton, a result of sub-
stracting the Boston Power Associates lease payment and
city services from the present contractual rate of $15.70.
Basically, the same result holds true if the plant is
a joint Somerville and Cambridge project built in Somerville
to serve the Somerville loop. The impacts upon Somerville
are assumed to change little if at all from the Somerville
only facility. Cambridge, however, makes a clear gain.
Its tip fee drops from $18.65/ton to much lower tip fees
in the recommended scenarios. It also potentially gains
the use of the transfer station for other purposes.
If the joint plant is constructed in Somerville to
distribute steam to the Cambridge loop, then the lease
payment for the plant and 4000 feet of pipe are $110,000.
Somerville receives $42,000 for the plant and $13,000 for
the Somerville portion of the pipe, and Cambridge is paid
$55,000 for the Cambridge portion of the pipe. In Somer-
ville, the $32,000 BPA lease and $13,500 in city services
is deducted from the $55,000 payment leaving $9,500 in
real revenue gains. This sum equals a $.27/ton tip fee
decrease on the net tip fee. In Cambridge, the $55,000
revenue gained by the pipe translates to a deduction of
$1.38/ton in the net tip fee, providing that all else is
equal.
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If the joint plant is sited in Cambridge and delivers
steam to the Cambridge Steam Loop, the lease payment amount
is $76,000, assuming the Prop 2 override. The $13,500
costs of city services are deducted leaving $62,500 for
Cambridge to absorb any unexpected costs arising from the
servicing the plant. This sum translates to $1.56/ton
tip fee reduction. This means that Somerville is actually
paying a slightly higher tip fee than would be necessary
if Cambridge were either to waive property tax charges or
lower those charges so that they just compensate the City
for the amount necessary to service the facility, and let
that reduction in plant expenses be reflected in lower
tip fees across the board. If not, in a sense Cambridge
has exported some of its property tax charges to Somerville
in the form of higher than necessary tip fees.
In sum, while Cambridge and Somerville should be aware
of the development pressures on the proposed sites and the
range of environmental concerns, the major impacts to be
assessed are job creation and the effect on the municipal
budgets. If job creation is a goal, then the waterwall
technology should be selected. The development of the
Somerville Steam Loop would seem to create more new jobs
than a hook-up to the existing Cambridge Steam Loop, how-
ever, these jobs remain hypothetical until several firms
that would use the steam have been identified and are com-
mitted to moving to the Somerville site. Also, this pre-
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sumes that the firms attracted to the area are coming
because of the steam energy available, yet the area may
be developed without the resource recovery plant.
A Cambridge loop distribution plan, although not
creating many new jobs per se, may act to stabilize the
positions infirms nowdependent upon the Cambridge Steam Loop.
The Cambridge Loop's great advantaqe over the Somerville
Steam Loop is that the Cambridge Steam Loop and the East
Cambridge Revitalization District it serves exist today,
while the Somerville Steam Loop and Boynton Yards economic
development area are only in the early planning stages.
Finally, if the plant is built in Somerville, the
property tax/lease payment impacts on the municipal budget
has a minimal effect. However, if the plant is built in
Cambridge, the difference in real versus nominal tip fees
for Somerville and Cambridge may be large enough to pro-
voke a two tip fee pricing structu're. The gains made in
the Cambridge budget could be split with Somerville so that
both communities would have real gains.
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1. Conversation with Jim Fife, Camp, Dresser & McKee,
Engineering and Planning Consultant Firm, Boston, MA,
March 9, 1982.
2. ibid.
3. Based upon representative figures for a moderate
impact facility from Professor Herr's Urban and Environ-
mental Impact Analysis Reader, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Spring 1982.
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Legal Issues
The complexity of the arrangements required for resource
recovery development demands that legal counsel be brought on
early in the project's planning life. However, a few of the
legal issues around resource recovery should be kept in mind
by the non-lawyer project planners.
The first important legal issue tobe consideredby project
planners is the constitutionality of the "flow control" laws,
which requireall waste collection withina political subdivision
to be tipped at the resource recovery facility. This approach
was attempted in Akron, Ohio and several affected parties sued
the City claiming that the law represented:
1. an illegal taking of property;
2. a violation of the commerce clause; and
3. a violation of anti-trust laws, from which cities
1
should not be automatically exempt.
The ruling had implications for two aspects of flow control
legislation. First, thewording of the Akron law was such that
2
it was illegal to recycle useful materials. This caused much of
the problem with regard to the suers' first two claims.
Cambridge and Somerville could avoid this difficulty by more
careful wordinq of the leqislation.
As far as the anti-trust immunity issue goes, the result
is still up in the air. The United States Supreme Court
remanded the Akron case to the Sixth Circuit for interpretation
of the anti-trust issues in light of related recent rulings
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on anti-trust immunity. The Supreme court did indicate that
there was to be no blanket immunity for cities, and that it
must be a clearly articulated, explicit statement of state
policy to grant a city monopoly rights. The rules for deter-
mining the legitimacy of the grant of monopoly rights were not
3
delineated. Thus, uncertainty surrounds the usefulness of
legislated waste flow control schemes as the mechanism for
securing a steady waste supply. This method should not be
relied upon by Cambridge and Somerville as long as alternative
methods of secruing a stable waste stream are possible (such
as the use of contractual agreements).
The secondlegal issue is the rules determining the transfer
of taxbenefits to a private owner of a municipal waste recovery
facility. The Internal Revenue Service does not want to grant
tax benefits if the private firm is performing a municipal
function, since this would be performed by someone in any case
and is therefore not "stimulating" the economy. Thus, the
closer the facility comes to beinqused solelyby municipalities,
the harder it is for the firm to claim the various federal
tax benefits. Three general rules have been developed by
Salamon Brothers, Inc., to maximize the probability of the
successful claiming of tax benefits:
1) the municipalities can require possession of the
resource recovery plant in default only;
2) the municipalities can influence the operating and
maintenance process only through performance standards; and
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3) the vendor must be allowed to offer services to
4
other waste creators besides the municipalities.
If these rules are followed, which should present no problem
for Somerville andCambridge, theprivate firm should be treated
as such by the Internal Revenue Service and be eligible to
receive the tax subsidies. A pre-construction tax ruling is
recommended, however.
The final legal issues relate to the availability of tax-
exempt financing for resource recovery plants. In order for an
industrial development bond, whose interest is taxable, to
qualify as an industrial revenue bond, whose interest is not,
certain conditions must be met with regard to the uses of the
bond and its users.
According to the I.R.S. Code, solid waste facilities are
exempt activities, meaning they qualify for industrial revenue
bond financing. Section 103(b)(4) (e) of the Code lists the
solid waste expenses which qualify, and it includes waterwall
incinerators and modular combustion units.5 Neither steam pipes
nor electric turbines qualify. The rule is, however, that not
more than 10% of the tax-exempt bond issue can be used to pur-
chase or build non-qualifyinq property.6 This means that the
bond issue must be large enough so that the steam pipe or
electric generator expenses amount to no more than 10% of the
total issue. Under all of the scenarios under consideration,
this qualification is met.
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In the users category, the bonds will not be qualified
for the tax exemption on interest if:
" a) payment of principal or interest is guaranteed
(in whole or in part) directly or indirectly by the United States
Government or any agency or instrumentality thereof under a
program, a principal purpose of which is to encourage energy
conservation or production; or
b) any part of the payment of principal or interest is
to be made directly or indirectly with funds provided under a
federal, state, or local program, a principal purpose of which
7
is to encourage conservation or energy production."
The Cambridge/Somerville facility meets these requirements.
Finally, there is some uncertainty about the future use
of revenue bond financing for resource recovery plants. The
Reagan Administration opposes the combined use of tax-exempt
financing with the other tax benefits. In fact, Congress
al eady passed legislation stating thatafter December 31, 1982,
projects utilizing tax-exempt financing are not eligible for
the business energy tax credit. Far more threatening to these
projects is the President's proposed legislation, which would
eliminate the investment tax credit and the use of an accelerated
depreciation schedule for resource recovery projects that were
8
financed with industrial revenue bonds. This proposal would
essentially elminate the possibility of tax-exempt financing
for privately owned resource recovery facilities. The Conqress
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has not taken any action on the proposal to date.
Given this uncertainty, Cambridge and Somerville would be
ill-advised to shoulder the risk of tax law changes on project
viability. Thus, if the firmthey select to develop and operate
the resource recovery plant chooses to use industrial revenue
bond financing, Somerville and Cambridge should agree to float
them only if contractual arrangements make clear that the
firm must accept full responsibility for this decision and
guarantee the tax-benefit reduction in tip fees that Cambridge
and Somerville must count on. Contingency plans must be made
if the tax law changes would endanger the firm's ability to
stay in business.
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Project Structure
As is clear from the preceeding analysis, the develop-
ment of contractual agreements clarifying the assumption
of risks and benefits by the various parties is critical
to the project's workability. If Somerville and Cambridge
are to embark on this project together, agreements between
the two cities must be worked out in advance of the other
contracts. Although there are a range of different names
that can be used to describe the agreements, essentially
there are two structural options--the cities can manage
or oversee the facility as a joint project, or one of the
two can take primary responsibility for the plant and
contract with the other for use of the plant's services.
Joint ownership, or oversiaht in the case of private
ownership, will mean that project risks and rewards are
shared betwen the two municipalities, usually on a pro
rata basis according to each city's trash load. Since Cam-
bridge and Somerville are so close in terms of annual
waste quantity, the responsibilities and decision-making
authority could be divided pretty much equally. A joint
agency should be set up so that other parties have one entity
with whichto deal. Decisionmaking power for daily operational
oversight must be vested here after decision making principles
are laid out. Processes for dispute resolution must be
delineated in advance.
218
The joint agency would have legal authority to issue
tax exempt bonds.' While it is unclear as to the magnitude
of the interest rate differential that would result, the
Argonne National Laboratory argues that joint agency bonds
may be more attractive to the financial community than single
9
municipal offerings.
The joint agency approach is desirable not only because
it spreads the project risks and benefits equally, making it
more attractive to both parties. The joint operation would
also facilitate sharing of municipal staff time and expertise --
two scarce resources. Plus the constant interaction mandated
by joint agencyi decision making will minimize the likelihood
of conflicts brewing until they got out of hand. The major
drawback to this approach is that considerable time would
need to be spent in working out this structure, perhaps de-
laying project implementation.
If this approach is not desired, either Somerville or
Cambridge could take the lead in developing the project.
The individual municipality would be responsible for servicing
the facility and assuming the public share of project risks,
which it could distribute to some extent to the other city
through the use of "put or pay" waste supply contracts.
The guarantees on the secondary municipality, however, are to
the first municipality rather than to other parties such as a
private owner. Inother words, should the non-owning/overseeinq
city-fail to live up to its commitments to supply an adequate
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quantity and/or quality of waste, the plant operator would
hold the owner/overseer municipality responsible and require
that party to collect from the negligent body. Thus, the
primary municipality does accept more of the risks under this
arrangement. It will, however, have all the decision making
power and accrue a greater share of project benefits.
This structure might be appealing in this case not only
for its streamlining of the pre-implementation process, but
also because it better facilitates different sets of interests
being addressed with one project. The two municipalities here
have different criteria by which to judge the project's
usefulness. For Somerville, the currentwaste disposal expenses
are relatively low, and the costs of withdrawing from a 20-year
disposal contract high. Thus, for Somerville to be a project
sponsor they would have to receive either tip fees well below
$15/ton or substantial economic development benefits in the
form of the attraction of industry to the Boynton Yards area.
Cambridge is in a different position. Their economic
development scheme is already under way, andresource recovery
is likely to have minimal impact on that process. Onthe other
hand, Cambridge is currently paying extremely high tip fees
to dispose of its trash--$18.65/ton. Thus, tip fees under
even $17/ton would be likely to spark Cambridge's interest.
Thus, Somerville and Cambridge have different threshold
levels necessary to spur interest in the project. One city's
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leadership might really speed up implementation, since it would
require less synthesization of project objectives and better
accomodate different goals. For instance, if the property tax
situation requires different real tipping fees for the two
cities (see Impacts section), this structure would be more
ammenable to that.
The decision on which structure is more appropriate is
dependent on other project decisions. For example, if the
Somerville Steam Loop is chosen as the energy customer,
the fact that the lowest tip fees are here would attract Cam-
bridge, plus the economic development opportunities would
draw Somerville. This would mean that joint project admin-
istration is suitable. On the other hand, if the Cambridge
Steam Loop is the purchaser, probably Cambridge would want
to take the lead and bring Somerville on board with even
lower tip fees--since Cambridge would benefit in compensating
ways from the tax revenue and the tip fee savings over current
costs. -
Thus, while project structure is a key issue that demands
early resolution, it should be seen as the first step to
implementation after the specifics of the project itself
have been determined.
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Implementation
The preceeding sections of this report have pointed out
that the development of a resource recovery facility on the
proposed site is technically feasible, and that it offers the
project sponsors a variety of potential benefits. Despite the
complexity of analysis and length of text required to reach
this point, determining the feasibility of resource recovery
development is the easy part. To bring the waste-to-energy
facility from concept to reality requires a considerable
investment of time, skills, and resources, as well as the
effective exercise of political leadership.
To predict with any seriousness the obstacles and facili-
tating circumstances of a Cambridge/Somerville resource recovery
plant would be a Ph.D. thesis in and of itself. Nonetheless,
a combination of a synthesis of the experiences of other resource
recovery development pro jects with a preliminary overview
of the individuals and groups that would be involved in
Somerville and Cambridge should provide a beginning point for
an implementation effort.
Under the best of circumstances, the development of a
resource recovery plant such as the one considered here re-
quires the commitment of eight or nine person-years over a three
to five year period. In addition, costs range from $250,000
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1
to $500,000 for the planning stage alone. The planning stage
of this facility will involve the resolution of complex issues
that result from the undertaking of a project by two municipal
governments in a way they have never before cooperated.
A project of this size and novelty is bound to draw public
attention. Therefore, it is important to analyze not only
what steps are involved in the implementation process, but who
is likely to be supportive of, opposed to, or neutral about
the project.
The spectrum of actors is wide -- ranging from grass-
roots energy activists to corporate executives to elected
officials -- each with a different set of project goals.
The various objectives do not necessarily conflict, nor
do they create an automatic alliance to push for project
implementation.
Given the non-committal, diffuse set of interests involved
in this possible resource recovery project, it is essential that
political leadership develop if this project is to move ahead
at all. The Cities' top elected officials must believe in the
project's worth and be committed to its development. While
true in many public projects this is especially true in this
case. Without a leader to bring together various interests
and.mobilize support, the project will probably never get
beyond the concept stage.
Once the necessary support and commitments are secured,
the implementation program for a Somerville/Cambridge resource
recovery facility can begin. The planning program components
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are discussed below. These components represent stages that
occur sequentially for the most part. However, some activities
should proceed simultaneously, as noted below.
Establish Project Committee. Once Cambridge and Somer-
ville decide to proceed further with resource recovery development
a project committee should be established. Membership should
include elected officials, key municipal managers, plus repre-
sentatives from the community at large, the potential energy
purchasers, and solid waste disposers. Project consultants
and municipal personnel (perhaps from the public works, plan-*
ning, and legal departments of both cities) serve as the staff
to this committee. A project manager should be designated
at this time.
In order to function effectively, this committee should
have decision-making authority and ability. Thus, the-
persons on the committee must be carefully selected to include
all important actors that could effect the project's eventual
success.
The committee's first task should be to select a con-
sultant who is already familiar with developing a waste-to-
energy plant, who complements the expertise available in house
in Somerville and Cambridge, and who the committee will feel
comfortable working with over a long period of time!
The project committee must also decide and then arrange
for the oversight structure early on. This structure delineates
patterns of authority. It should give adequate control and
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responsibility to both Somerville and Cambridge and include
a process for conflict resolution.
The following project development tasks should be con-
ducted under the auspices of this project committee.
Feasibility Analysis. Using this report as a base of
information and as evidence that a Cambridge/Somerville re-
source recovery plant is technically, economically, and environ-
mentally feasible, a study of the specific arrangements and
their impacts should be conducted. As the results of the feasi-
bility study help guide the rest of the project's development, this
should be the next step for the project committee. Much of the
necessary information collection and analysis has been completed
and is found in this document. A development of energy purchase
options, a more complete analysis of solid waste disposal
constraints and alternatives, and a more specific engineering
review of the construction and operating costs should be
sufficient to complete the work. Depending upon the abilities
and time of the project committee's staff, this additional
work could be done in house or given to a consultant. A
feasibility study done by outside consultants will probably
hold more weight in the bonding markets.
Public Education and Outreach. Because developing a
waste-to-energy facility is an expensive and long term project
that affects a basic municipal service, public outreach and
education are important to a project's success. Materials
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should be prepared which promote the project and answer some
questions on why a resource recovery plant, how does itoveratp,
why will it be different from the old municipal incinerator, and
what will it cost or gain the community. A series of public
meetings should be held to present the idea and to gain com-
munity input and support. The public outreach effort is
especially important if the project is to be funded with a
general obligation bond, since issuing these bonds may require
voter approval. The public outreach effort could also be
used to discuss how a recycling program could fit in and for
the municipalities to get feedback on how solid waste service
in general might be improved. The support of the community
that should result can be translated into long term political
support of the resource recovery plant.
Marketing the Project. Presumably this component's activi-
ties began with the securing of the commitment and support for the
project. Yet it is at this stage especially that the project
needs aggressive salesmanship. With the feasibility analysis in
hand, the project is marketed not only to potential energy
customers, but also to political and financial supporters.
The ef forts of this component should result in key initial
commitments made and important relationships developed. For
Somerville and Cambridge, the most important commitments
come from themselves to each other, and from energy purchasers.
The commitments should be long term and in writing through
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strong letters of intent or preferably, signed contracts.
During this stage all the key participants must come to under-
stand the commitment they are making. Once the project proceeds
into the next stage, withdrawal should entail severe economic
penalties.
Request for Proposal Issued. The project committee then
issues a Request for Proposal (RFP) statement. Given the
multitude of objectives that resource recovery facilities
can serve, the most important element in facilitating contractor
selection is the clarification of the community's priorities
before issuing the RFP. The RFP is the mechanism for selecting
the full service vendor and perhaps project owner. Careful
preparation of the RFP will maximize the comparability and
thus usefulness of the responses, thereby facilitating evaluation
and subsequent contractor selection. Such specificity early on
will also simplify the negotiations by limiting the range of
topics to be included and will likely result in earlier _
contract signings.
The primary objective for Somerville and Cambridge in the
development of the resource recovery facility is the provision
of waste disposal service at a lower cost to the municipalities.
However, given their restrictive budgetary processes, Cambridge
and Somerville cannot afford to trade off even extremely low
future tip fees for just slightly higher-than-current ones in
the early project years. The risk structure and timing of
benefits should be organized with this fact in mind, and the
.RFP should state this clearly.
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The RFP should specify the categories of risk that the
community is willing to absorb as a result of its reflection on
the risk analysis section of this report. In addition, the
RFP should be for the specific tonnage capacity desired to
handle solid waste from Cambridge and Somerville only, since
neither Somerville nor Cambridge desires a regional facility,
The RFP should also state the criteria by which the
proposals will be evaluated. The project committee then
evaluates the proposals, selects the contractor, and begins
the negotiation process. By the end of this stage, all con-
tracts should be finalized and signed.
Plant Permits and Approvals. Several local, state, and
federal requirements must be satisfied by the resource recovery
facility before it can operate. These permitting processes
can occur simultaneously.
On the local level, the municipal Board of Health must
issue a permit to operate all facilities handling solid waste -
disposal, according to Massachusetts General Law, Chapter III,
Sction 150A. A public hearing must be held prior to final
approval. However, since both of the possible sites for the
resource recovery plant are already used for refuse disposal', a
new permit may not be necessary. The present solid waste transfer
stations in Somerville and Cambridge have presumably received
Board of Health approvals already. According to the Massachu-
setts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) , if
all requirements including the public hearing were met during the
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original permit process, then the host city can simply agree
in writing to the transfer of the permit for the site assign-
ment to the new facility. 2
At the state level, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
requires that the specific plant design meet DEQE approval.
DEQE evaluates the specific elements of the proposed facility
in terms of air pollution, (MGL, Ch. III, Sect. 142A-142E),
water pollution (MGL, Ch. 21, Sect. 43), sewerage (Ch. 21,
Sect. 43) , and the disposal of ash and other unprocessed
solid waste (MGL, Ch. III, Sect. 150A). An Environmental
Notification Form (ENF) must also be completed before DEOP
approval. The ENF is used to screen out the project areas
needing to be addressed in an Environmental Impact Report
(EIR, MGL,-Ch. 30, Sect. 62), an extensive and expensive pro-
cess. The ENF looks at 25 different areas ranging from
archeological to wind an, shadow impacts. The ENF process
ends in a categorical yes or no on whether an EIR is required.
To date the only comparable waste-to-energy facility built
in the Commonwealth under these laws was only required to
submit an ENF. The 240-ton per day waterwall plant that
was recently completed in Pittsfield met all necessary require-
3
ments and did not need to prepare an EIR.
Once satisfactorily meeting DEQE and ENF or EIR requirements,
the DEQE gives preliminary approval to the project. A public
hearing is held before final DEQE approval is granted.
On the national level, most of the federal requirements
are satisfied by Massachusetts requirements. The only exception
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for a resource recovery facility is the federal requirement
for a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit if
certain emissions are greater than 100 tons per year. The
PSD permit is issued by the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. It is similar in scope to an EIR. Without
knowing the specific technology, it is unclear whether or not
the Cambridge/Somerville plant would require a PSD permit to
operate.
In order to avoid unnecessary delays, all the permit
issuing parties should be notified early on in the project's
development, so that all permitting procedures can begin
as soon as possible.
Financing. The short length of this passage is not an
indication of the relative importance of securing financing.
On the contrary, the ultimate success of a waste-to-energy
project depends on the ability to secure financing. However,
this topic has been dealt with extensively throughout this
report, and detailed discussion here would be repetitive.
Unless the plant is to be privately owned and financed,
Cambridge and Somerville will need to hire a finance advisor
to help plan and prepare the bond offering, a bond counsel
to render a legal opinion on the bond, and a bond underwriter
to actually sell the bond. The set of supporting documents
for the bond sale includes contracts for the construction
and operation of the facility, energy sales and solid waste
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supply, as well as a statement describing the overall financing
plan, bond security, and the flow of funds. Once the bond has
been sold, the planning phase of the project ends and the
construction can begin.
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1. Northern Energy Corporation, Energy from Solid
Waste, A Primer for Industry and Local Government,
Northern Energy Corporation, Boston, MA, 1981, Chap-
ter 7, p. 17.
2. Conversation with Tom Parks, Department of En-
vironmental Quality Engineering, Metropolitan Boston/
Northeast Region, April 14, 1982.
3. Conversation with Ashvin Patel, Massachusetts
Environmental Impact Review, Boston, MA, April 13, 1982.
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SECTION VI--CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
This summary takes the information from the previous
sections of this feasibility analysis and puts it in the
form of a decision tree. The decision tree does not result
in specific recommendations for developing the Somerville/
Cambridge resource recovery facility, rather it presents
six decision points. The decision tree is found on the
following page.
Decision Point #1: To be or not to be.
The first and most important choice to make is whether
or not to proceed with the resource recovery project.
Cambridge and Somerville have to weigh the benefits of
developing a resource recovery facility on this site and
the costs--both financial and non-financial--against
their priorities and competing projects. The report has
described and analyzed the project's components, but in
the end the project's worthiness must be judged accord-
ing to the alternative uses of the cities' time and re-
sources.
If the decision is to build, then Cambridge and
Somerville can move to Decision Point #2. If the choice
is made to not build the waste-to-energy plant, certain
project goals can still be pursued by Somerville and
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Cambridge. Although it is unlikely for Somerville which
has one of the lowest tip fees in the area to attain lower
tip fees without a venture of this sort, Cambridge could
investigate alternative solid waste disposal arrangements.
Cambridge's $18.65/ton rate is one of the highest in the
area. It would seem likely that better refuse disposal
terms are available.
Cambridge's and Somerville's work on economic develop-
ment will continue. To date, their efforts have not in-
cluded an energy incentive to draw new businesses, so that
not building the plant should not disrupt their efforts.
Also, other forms of renewable, affordable energy can
be developed if renewable energy is the goal. Solar and
wind have promising applications,
Finally, a recycling program could be established
to decrease the size of the solid waste stream and to
raise revenues. If a recycling program is desired it is
important to understand similar local efforts, past and
present, in order to devise a program that will work.
Decision Point #2: Cambridge and/or Somerville Solid Waste.
At this decision point it must be determined whether
the refuse to be handled is from Cambridge and/or Somerville.
Although a single-city project is feasible, a dual-city
project is much better from a financial and risk-sharing
perspective. The Cities would both gain if they cooperated
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on this project more than if they pursued action individu-
ally.
As noted in the legal section, a project oversight
structure that reflects the different needs and interests of
Somerville and Cambridge in this cooperative effort must
be make early on. The greatly different current tip fees
of $15.70/ton in Somerville versus $18.65/ton in Cambridge
demand particular attention. If the plant is built in Cam-
bridge, awar-eness of this tip fee gap combined with property
tax revenues may help the City offer Somerville a lower
tip fee for the resource recovery facility. In this way,
the gains made in Cambridge can be shared with Somerville,
so that both communities are better off.
Decision Point #3: Energy Customer.
The Cities must determine which energy customer they
could line up to purchase the facility's energy output.
If the plant is to handle Somerville trash only, then the
only energy customer is the proposed Somerville Steam
Loop. Similarly if the plant is to handle Cambridge trash
only, the energy customer becomes the Cambridge Steam
Loop.
If both Cambridge and Somerville refuse is to be
burned, then the energy can be sold in the form of steam
to either the Cambridge Steam Loop or the Somerville Steam
Loop, or both steam and electricicty can be generated and
sold to the Somerville Steam Loop and Boston Edison.
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While the Somerville Loop in theory provides more new
jobs to the area and so is attractive, it is clearly only
in the planning stages. The resource recovery plant could
be pursued in conjuction with this economic development,
but project planners cannot at this time count on the energy
customers.
The public policy gain associated with serving the
Cambridge Steam Loop is the promotion of district heating
as an energy efficient process, as part of the City's
general commitment to energy planning. Although it is unclear
what new jobs would be created by serving the Cambridge
Steam Loop, this action could have a stabilizing effect
on the jobs that are now dependent upon the Cambridge
Steam Loop.
If electricity as well as steam are desired energy
products because of the guaranteed revenues from elec-
tricity sales or other reasons, then the steam is delivered
to the Somerville Loop and the electricity to Boston
Edison. The equipment needed to produce the electricity
is a major additional expense. A steam/electricity cogenerat-
ing operation to the Cambridge Steam loop while technically
possible is not economically viable because of the high quality
steam the Cambridge Steam Company now produces. The Somer-
ville Loop would only demand low quality steam, making the
differential in steam produced to steam delivered adequate
enough to also produce electricity with less equipment and
less expense than for the Cambridge Loop.
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Decision Point #4: Public or Private Ownership.
If the other preliminary decisions have been made, at
Cambridge and/or Somerville must decide on whether the plant
is to be publicly or privately owned. This choice affects
the technology and financing options selected, and risks
assumed in building and operating the waste-to-energy faci-
lity. It is a function of Somerville's and Cambridge's
opportunities to raise the needed capital, desired risk pos-
ture, time horizon, political leadership, and theory on the
role of government.
Having made the choice of either public or private
ownership a specific scenario as developed in this analysis
becomes the most appropriate. If the waste-to-energy
plant is to handle Somerville refuse only, it can only serve
the Somerville Loop. Thus if it is publicly owned then
Scenario llA is the best choice, and if it is privately
owned, then Scenario llB.
When the Cambridge Loop is the desired energy customer
and public ownership the desired structure, then Scenario
lA, a modular facility makes the most sense. On the other
hand, the tax benefits of private ownership makes Scenario
2B the private ownership choice here.
If the Somerville Steam Loop only is the selected
energy customer, then the ownership question has much the
same results as for the Cambridge Steam Loop. If publically
owned, then a modular unit, Scenario 6A, or if privately
owned, then a waterwall system, Scenario 7B best fits Cambridge's
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and Somerville's needs and interests.
Finally, if electricity and steam are the energy products
of the resource recovery plant, then Scenario 8A if publicly
owned, or Scenario 8B if privately owned would be developed.
Decision Point #5: Procurement Method.
When the plant is privately owned, the private firm
builds and operates the resource recovery facility. Cambridge
and Somerville would make contractual agreements about tip
fees, solid waste supply, property taxes, site, city services,
and perhaps financing with the private owner. However, how
the plant is to be built and operated is the responsibility
of the owner. Thus for Cambridge and Somerville, there is
no procurement issue.
In a publicly owned waste-to-energy project, as out-
lined in the risks section, either a full service vendor,
turnkey contract or an Architect and Engineer (A & E) pro-
curement approach could be used. While costing the most
up-front to Somerville and Cambridge, the full service ap-
proach allocates more of the risks of both building and
operating the resource recovery plant to the private sec-
tor, than the other methods. The turnkey approach would
split the risks, with building the facility, going to the
private sector, and the operating of the plant to Somerville
and Cambridge. The A & E route leaves all risks and rewards
of construction and operation in public hands.
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Decision Point #6: Financing.
This is the last major decision point before the resource
recovery project moves from the planning stage to construction.
If the waste-to-energy plant is publicly owned, a general
obligation bond (GOB) would be used to finance it.
If the resource recovery plant is privately owned,
then revenue bonds or financing from private institutions
are the two options. This would be a major negotiating
point for Cambridge and Somerville and the private firm
involved.
In sum, this feasibility study of a resource recovery
facility to serve Cambridge and /or Somerville demonstrates
that this project is technically, financially, economically,
environmentally, and legally possible. With Proposition
2 and other municipal budget constraints and cutbacks,
unemployment on the rise, and the continued instability of
energy supply and prices, the proposed waste-to-energy plant
offers Somerville and Cambridge the opportunity to address
these problems in a systematic manner offering long term
benefits. At the very least, the results of this study,
compel Cambridge and Somerville to give the development of
a waste-to-energy plant serious consideration.
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Epilogue
For nearly two years, we have been exploring the con-
cept of community energy planning as a way to develop a
degree of local control over energy use and production,
and over the economy. This report represents an extension
of our work in Somerville and Cambridge that focussed on
the conservation and management of energy. Although
important, conservation of energy is ultimately limited
as a means to promote local control. It represents the
better management of an imported resource, but not control
over resource allocation. The local production and
ownership of energy fundamentally changes the relationship
of the energy producer and the energy consumer, so that
community control becomes possible.
While a variety of local energy production methods
exist, we concentrated on resource recovery for two
reasons. First, it inherently combines the production
of energy with economic development by disposing of solid
waste in an environmentally sound manner. All these
issues are of critical importance to cities like Cambridge
and Somerville. Resource recovery thus offers the
opportunity to piggyback the support and needs of these
constituencies behind one project.
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the jobs, energy and cost benefits, and that other
projects may be more appropriate to attain these ends.
Also, as the project analysis developed it became
increasingly clear that neither the local control of
energy production nor economic development would be
the primary goal of building the waste-to-energy plant.
Instead, lowering the costs of municipal solid waste
disposal emerged as the focus with energy production
and economic development as sidelines.
In other words, the idea became simply another
public works project, and not a demonstration of local
control. In fact, the public works project itself
of building and operating a waste-to-energy plant would
probably not even be local. Almost no community has
the ability to develop a resource recovery facility,
so that an interested municipality would have to turn
to the private sector. The resource recovery industry
consists of a few very large national and multinational
corporations. Local control is not in their vocabulary.
In sum, while it may be interesting from the per-
spective of a city manager, public works department, or
planner,we do not think the results are compelling enough
to compete with other municipal priorities. (On the other
hand, Cambridge Steam Company or a private resource recovery
firm may find the results of this analysis positive enough
to pursue this project. Then it becomes totally outside
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the realm of our public interest objectives.) Most
importantly to us, the project does not promote community
control of energy or the economy. We had begun the
project, hopeful that resource recovery could further
community energy planning as a means to greater social
and economic justice. Unfortunately, it will not.
